Some hoteliers embrace reasonable foreseeability as a mitigation backstop – in other words, “If we don’t perceive or acknowledge a specific threat, we’re not responsible for the fallout.” But times are changing. Threats against hotels have grown and proliferated, and totality of circumstances (aka, “totality of events”) is a real phenomenon – in other words, “there are copious examples of hotel violence, and, therefore, we are on notice.” Hotel attack statistics, which demonstrate totality of circumstances, are critical to mitigate hotel violence via intelligence-driven physical security, well informed liabilities policies, clearly-defined insurance coverage, and safety/security-minded hotel development.

Hotel Violence
The “sky is not falling.” Hotels around the world are not being razed to the ground on a weekly basis. Having said this, hotel violence happens every month, globally. The World Economic Forum’s ͞”Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, 2017″ recently asserted, regarding tourism and hotels, that, “geopolitical insecurity is the new normal.” At the same time, STR Global reports that the hotel sector has expanded 17% over the past decade. (“STR: Global hotel inventory has grown 18% in 10 years,” Hotel News Now, 27 March 2018). Combined, these two issues signify increased hotel risk in an uncertain world. More pointedly, hotel attack statistics demonstrate that from 2010-end 2016, there were anywhere between two and 15 hotel attacks every month, globally. These included high, medium, low, and no casualty events.

Who are the belligerents? Statistics tell us that they are terrorists, criminals, political action groups, and people with mental problems. In the US, for example, data says criminals accounted for over half of hotel violence during the 2010-end 2016 timeframe. In contrast, in Asia, terrorists were responsible for most hotel violence, and most of that was Islamist jihadist driven.

Aside from the Mandalay Bay shooting, there have been scores of high-profile hotel attacks in the past few years, including:

• Sousse, Tunisia: 2 hotels, the 5-star Hôtel Imperial Marhaba, and the 3-star Soviva Resort Hôtel, 38 killed, 39 wounded
• Bamako, Mali: the 4-star Radisson Blu hotel, 20 killed, 7 wounded, 170 hostages
• Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: the 4-star Splendid Hotel, 30 killed, 56 wounded
• Grand-Bassam beach, Ivory Coast: impacted 6 hotels, namely the 3-star L’ Etoile du Sud Hotel, 19 killed, 33 wounded
• Manila, Philippines: active shooter-arsonist-robber, the 5-star Maxims Hotel and the Resorts World Manila casino, 37 killed, 70 injured
• Kabul, Afghanistan: the 3-4 star (est) Inter-Continental Hotelin Kabul, 40 killed, 22 injured

At US hotels in the 2010-end 2016-time frame, there have been several terrorist bombings, multiple protest-riots, numerous shootings (including active shooters), and a throng of instances of explosives brought into hotel rooms – shades of Mandalay Bay. A few examples are:

• Charlotte, NC: Black Lives Matter protest turned riot impacted 7 4-5-star hotels, 1 killed, 32 wounded at/near/around hotels
• New York City: Al Qaeda bombing, New York City, 2 hotels impacted, primarily the 3-star Townhouse Inn of Chelsea, 31 wounded at/near/around the hotel
• Los Angeles, CA: shooting at the 4-star The Standard-Downtown LA, 1 killed, 3 wounded
• Orlando, FL: active shooter, 2 hotels impacted, the 3-star Comfort Inn and Suites Convention Center, and the 4-star Westgate Lakes Resort and Spa, 2 killed, 1 wounded
• Chicago, IL: shooting, 4-star Palmer House Hilton Hotel, 1 wounded

Lawsuits Aside from the human and material costs, hotel violence sometimes results in lawsuits. Below are several examples:

• £ 3 million-pound plaintiff victory (settlement, rough cost estimate, exact amount undisclosed), Will Pike, Taj Mahal Hotel negligence alleged RE: the 2008 Mumbai, India attacks
• Ongoing civil lawsuit against TUI over the Hôtel Imperial Marhaba attack (previous suit RE: negligence over EU “duty of care” did not apply to tourists who voluntarily went on holiday in a dangerous area; interestingly, it can be argued that this was opposite of the impetus behind the Pike lawsuit)
• $200,000 suit for a hotel shooting in Chicago, current status UNK
• $6 million plaintiff victory over a sexual assault at a hotel in Boston
• $8 million plaintiff victory over inadequate crisis management regarding a deadly hotel stabbing in Texas
• $ damages to be determined, plaintiff victory over a physical assault, Humphries Vs. NY-NY Hotel-Casino, Las Vegas

In each lawsuit, the hotels argued that they could not have predicted the specific, violent episode in question was going to happen – reasonable foreseeability – and, therefore, they were not liable. In all but one case, the Taj Mahal, there was no intelligence warning that an attack was forthcoming. Government intelligence had indeed warned of the Mumbai attack, and reportedly, the hotel did little, if anything, to prepare for it, which is one reason the defendants settled the case.

In most other cases, the plaintiffs successfully argued that, in one form or another, the defendants had experienced some type of similar hotel violence in the past – totality of circumstances – and they should have been prepared for it.

The stabbing case in Texas ruled against the hotel for, among other things, its lack of effective crisis response. While not specifically referred to as totality of circumstances, the ruling spoke directly to the hotel’s ill preparedness, which infers it was oblivious to real world hotel violence and how to deal with the consequences.

The Humphries Vs. NY/NY case has caused some lawyers to assert that the hotel industry is facing a shift away from reasonable foreseeability to totality of circumstances.

Craig Drummond, a lawyer in the Humphries case, recently said, “In order to show that a business had knowledge that a future incident would occur, you do not have to show that the exact same incident, like a shooting or a fight, previously occurred. The standard is now that you only need to show a general likeness of prior events that would put the business owner on notice. (“Court ruling could help Las Vegas shooting victims suing MGM,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 30 April 2018.)

Robert Eglet, a key lawyer in one of the MGM Mandalay Bay lawsuits, echoed this, asserting, “It will be much more difficult for MGM and Mandalay Bay to resolve these cases without going to trial or settling. We can show through the totality of the events at MGM properties around the world that this is something that could happen and was reasonably foreseeable, and they had a duty to provide adequate security and didn’t.͟ (“Court ruling could help Las Vegas shooting victims suing MGM,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 30 April 2018.)

Hotel attack statistics
Data and case studies on hotel attacks can help hoteliers understand the hotel threat environment – the totality of circumstances – which, in turn, can aid them in developing security, liabilities, insurance, and property development mitigation strategies. For example, if data and case studies reveal that, in the US, the vast majority of hotel violence results from crime, then hotel lawyers and insurers can reduce what might be lopsided reliance on government programs such as the Department of Homeland Security’s SAFETY Act (Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies) and TRIPA (the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act), and instead develop appropriate physical security tactics, andbuy insurance policies that name criminal violence as specific perils. Similarly, if data trends indicate that terrorism is the impetus behind hotel attacks in Asia, then hoteliers can investigate various countries’ government insurance programs (broadly referred to as Pool Reinsurance, or “Pool RE”) and include them in their mitigation strategies. In another example, bombing trends in Asia – or the rest of the world, for that matter – can help hoteliers undertake appropriate counter terrorism physical security measures where appropriate such as car bomb inspections bays, K-9 inspections, setback, and the like. Overall, data on hotel attacks can help hoteliers become proactive, widen their mitigation options, and energize inhouse decision-making.

Conclusion
Wrapping it all up, while court decisions are never 100% anchored to precedent trends, there is, nonetheless, a pattern demonstrating that hotels cannot consistently depend on reasonable foreseeability as a mitigation strategy for hotel violence. Totality of circumstances has gained traction. And why not? Totality of circumstances helped motivate the US hotel industry in the countrywide offensive against bedbugs that began in earnest in 2016 and is continuing in 2018. Similarly, on 6 September 2018, the American Hotel and Lodging Association held a major conference featuring some of the biggest hotel brands declaring a widespread campaign to protect hotel employees from sexual harassment. Doing the same to mitigate hospitality violence, enabled by hotel attack statistics and case studies, is the next logical – and critical –step.

Incorporation of Flame and Impact-Resistant Materials

One of the most searing images of 09/11 is the progressive collapse of the upper floors of both World Trade Center towers and the “pancaking” of the floors on top of each other. Various theories have been proffered by design and construction experts on the exact sequence of events that triggered the collapse. However, all agree that the “inner core” of the building most likely could have withstood collapse if it had been constructed of reinforced concrete, rather than steel. In fact, the US Institute of Standards and Technology (IST), in its final report on the collapse of the Twin Towers, noted that alternate weight bearing and weight distribution technologies as well as the use of more robust fire resistant materials in construction would contribute to enhancing structural integrity in a fire or dynamic impact to a high rise building.

It is clear that 09/11 ushered in a sea change in the thought process, design and architecture of skyscrapers, defined in this article as those structures exceeding 1250 feet (381 meters) in height. One of the most promising developments since that tragedy is the use of Ultra High-Performance Concrete (UHPC). The material is fire resistant due to the inclusion of polypropylene fibers and provides for greater load bearing and shifting capabilities in the event of aircraft impact or significant ground movement due to earthquake. It is up to 1,000 times more durable than standard construction concrete and lasts 2-3 times longer. Its compressive strength is outstanding and due to its low porosity, it is resistant to cracking and water infiltration. Its use in the construction of bridges, both in the US and Europe, has taken hold and various versions of UHPC are being tested for use in high rise construction.

Fire Suppression Systems, Escape Routes and Procedures

The fire suppression systems in the WTC were in large part rendered inoperable due to the extremely high temperatures caused by burning aviation fuel and other volatile chemicals. In an effort to enhance autonomous on-site fire suppression, the builders of new superstructures are encasing sprinkler mechanisms in concrete and adding high capacity exhaust and ventilation systems. Laminated, heat-resistant glass is being incorporated into window design. The architectural firm which designed the new One World Trade Center, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, has added chemical and biological agent air filters and increased the width of escape staircases by 50%. In addition, it has added an emergency staircase for the exclusive use of first responders. In an effort to impart clear guidance to building occupants in an evacuation, the New York City Fire Department, for its part, will now take over the building’s PA system upon arrival, thus avoiding possible conflicting guidance given by the building’s security personnel and first responders. It is noted that on 09/11, may occupants of the Twin Towers returned to their office space after beginning evacuation inasmuch as the pre-recorded building security announcement instructed them to do so. This caused an unknown number of people to perish.

A school of thought has emerged that the use of elevators to escape a building fire should not be automatically prohibited. In fact, both in Europe and in China, service elevators specifically designed for the use of first responders in an evacuation are being designed. This would assist firefighters in extinguishing a blaze on the upper floors and would facilitate the arrival of emergency equipment on site. Response time would be shortened and occupants would not have to wait hours in smoke-filled or burning floors for help to arrive. The elevators and their mechanical and electrical components are designed using fire resistant materials and are powered by a dedicated electricity source. Encased in the reinforced concrete core, the elevators can also be used by properly trained personnel to facilitate emergency evacuation.

Obviously, 09/11 was the catalyst for significant enhancements in building construction, but one must not forget the need for security safeguards at ingress and egress as well as the need to train. In the US, the visitor to a high rise is now routinely challenged should the person not possess a card key allowing access to the building and even the elevators. Turnstyle-like barriers are in place recording each and every swipe of an access pass and concrete barriers are visible on the building’s exterior. Fire drills have been made mandatory both by building owners and by city officials and sprinkler systems and alarms have become so advanced that fire departments can receive electronic notification of the exact floor and location of a hazard through a signal sent from the device to the department’s dispatch. Clearly, these are positive developments that will contribute to first responder efficiency and occupant safety. Tragically, many of these cutting edge enhancements were not in place in London and what was available was not maintained or properly used. Additionally, a retrofit of existing buildings is not always possible.

US Firm Under Scrutiny

The US firm that supplied the cladding for the Grenfell Tower, Arconic, said it was said discontinuing sales of Reynobond PE for tower blocks due to “issues” identified by the fire, which is feared to have killed at least 79. The government of UK Prime Minister Theresa May said 75 buildings in 26 council areas had now failed fire safety tests – every one tested so far. Tower managers from across the UK are being urged to send in samples of their building’s cladding components for combustibility tests. Ironically, Ms. May’s government, while urging further testing, acknowledges that it did not propery define the degree of “combustibility” that exterior cladding was required to withstand when it promulgated its latest rules, which are widely thought to be insufficient and poorly monitored. There is no excuse, however, for fire alarms systems that were defective or for a building design that allowed for one fire escape staircase only.

The London Grenfell Tower fire shows that in spite of existing, advanced standards for building construction and fire suppression, if the political will and the financial support do not exist, such improvements are little more than paper changes. In London as in New York, the results were tragic. The challenge for modern societies is to ensure that safety, both in design, construction and in emergency procedures, keeps apace with new technology. City managers and councils must ensure that building fire codes are written reflecting the incorporation of the most cutting-edge technologies. Advanced and recurrent training for first responders and building occupants must not be an afterthought and government agencies charged with oversight must be held accountable as well.

One thing is almost universally true in these case

The active shooter, that person who storms into a classroom, cinema, restaurant or house of worship, is most likely suffering from acute mental illness. The mental illness often leads to delusional feelings and a profound sense of victimization. As investigators delve into the shooter’s past to determine just what triggered such violent behavior, the phrases “you did this to me” or “you made me do this” either written or spoken, were articulated by the perpetrator in the days or weeks preceding the killing spree.

We’re not addressing here motivational factors that might have contributed to the violent behavior, such as political, ideological or religious opinions or racial animus, though those are often present as well. In those instances, mental illness may be a secondary factor or not a factor at all. What we are addressing is the emotional component when mental illness severe that beset the shooter and that lead the shooter to often uncontrollable outbursts of violent behavior that culminate in a mass shooting.

Of course, each case is different and no hard and fast rule applies to each mass shooting in the US. But when taken as a whole, we can discern some characteristics of those who perpetrate a mass shooting from a mental health perspective.

In general terms, the perpetrator has suffered from mental illness in the past, whether diagnosed properly or not. What’s more, studies of perpetrators-such as Adam Lanza, the author of the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting-have shown that the mental illness, even if diagnosed, was not treated with correct medical protocols. By this, we mean either accepted clinical practices for treating the illness were not adhered to or the patient himself did not follow the prescribed treatment. In the case of Lanza, both are true. He suffered from untreated Asperger’s syndrome, which is suspected of worsening his mental illness. At the same time, he did not follow the prescribed treatment for his mental illness, once diagnosed.

In the case of Cho Seung Hui, the shooter in the Virginia Tech massacre who killed 31 people, we also see a case of severe mental illness not properly diagnosed. Although he had been counseled in the past about violent outbursts and harassment of other students, his feelings of victimization, made worse by bullying, were manifest during the shooting spree when he railed against everyone associated with him or the university in any way. During the subsequent investigation, police uncovered at least two videos he made of himself. One of the two he apparently recorded for post-incident airing. In that one, he makes it clear that others made him commit the horrific acts that day at the university. “I did not want to do this. You made me do it”, he states.

A couple of other characteristics we often see in the perpetrators of mass shootings are self-isolation, a “loner”, social awkwardness and the inability to develop meaningful relationships with friends or family. Indeed, in many cases a close friend or family member would be one of the first to detect changes in personality that hint at something being awry and thus attempt to force intervention. But all too often, the rage and victimization remain inside, as the eventual shooter is living in a surreal environment, convinced that there is no way out, no escape, from his brutal world unless he lashes out against the very threats that he believes are victimizing him.

There are many other factors that influence a shooter of this type and we do not discount ideology. But it is the leap that the eventual shooter must make that is addressed here. The decision to perpetrate the crime or not is a conscious one and thus the ability of the shooter to make that leap is influenced greatly by his mental state.

In an upcoming letter, we’ll take a look at some of the differences discernible in cases wherein the shooter is acting out of a deeply held ideological conviction as opposed to one who is reacting to years of internalized strife that manifests itself in violence.

(Security Strategies Today offers a one or two day in depth course on preparing your company or workforce in the event of an active shooter incident. The course address both the mindset of the shooter and tactical issues for those caught up in the event. Contact us for a quote.)

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The initial investigative findings revealed not only kinship between the Paris and Brussels attackers, but operational links.  Specifically, Salah Abdeslam, believed to be the only surviving member of the group that perpetrated the Paris attacks, was located and taken into custody only days before four bombers carried out the coordinated attacks in Brussels.  Convinced that Abdeslam’s arrest would expose a follow-on plot being planned in Paris, the Brussels subjects switched gear, altered their tactics and opted to inflict mayhem on the EU capital, according to investigators.

Mohamed Abrini, identified as the man in the cap and grey jacket in the Brussels airport CCTV frame captured just before the blast, has admitted that he played a role in the attacks and that he fled after his bomb failed to detontate.  Also, his DNA and fingerprints were lifted from the Renault Clio used in the Paris bombings.  He and Abdeslam were observed on video at a mini mart fleeing the French capital the night of the attacks, November 13, 2015.

French national police BOLO for subject Abdeslam Salah

With major investigations spanning several European countries, it is worth taking a look at EU history and evolution.  The EU has gone from a loosely-affiliated trading block at its inception in the years following World War II to an integrated, social, diplomatic, defense and legal entity.  The euro is one of the world’s reserve currencies. The block’s navies patrol the Mediterranean in joint operations and air traffic and safety are regulated by EASA, the European Aviation Safety Agency.  It has a common agricultural policy and trade negotiations and tariff agreements are negotiated for the entire block through the European Commission, the executive branch.  Free movement of goods, services and people is guaranteed within the Schengen area of the continent, which includes most EU countries, plus Switzerland and Norway.  In real terms, there is significant integration and national sovereignty has been largely ceded to Brussels in some areas, such as in anti-trust and intellectual property matters.

But harmonization of laws and integration have their limits.  The block’s “common defense” initiatives play second fiddle to NATO and to individual, sovereign deployments, such as the French mission in Mali.  Additionally, some countries, in particular the UK, are loathe to accept less skilled migrants from fellow EU members Bulgaria and Romania and instead have negotiated complex deals with Brussels to stagger their arrival and their ability to obtain work permits.  It is in effect a “second tier” status for some EU citizens.  The permanance and cohesiveness of the block-the idea that Europe must remain unified in order to avoid a repeat of its two devastating 20th century wars-are achieved through institutionalized back and forth negotiation and much give and take among member states.

But in spite of such expansive integration, it turns out that the EU has purposely limited information sharing, especially with non EU members but within the block itself.  This can have devastasting effects on the safety and security of its citizens.  The elimination of cross border checks withn the Schengen area necessitates even greater data and intelligence sharing among authorities.  How can police in France be alerted to the arrival of a fugitive travelling by car from Spain?  How can Italian authorities interdict a large illegal drug shipment being carried by a passenger on an overnight train from Germany?  How can a human trafficking ring be broken up and its victims rescued if only fragmentary intelligence and investigative results are being shared? Why is one immigration policy pursued in Germany and and yet another in Austria?

Belgian troops on patrol outside the headquarters of the European Commission in Brussels

The fact is fugitives and traffickers are caught and contraband is detected and intercepted, but with less frequency and efficiency than what one would expect from nations with world class police and intel agencies.  True integration of police services, such as what we see in the United States with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, present in every FBI field office, does not exist.  That (near) seemless, broad-based, daily sharing of current, actionable intel that has helped the JTTFs prevent countless acts of terrrorism since 09/11 exists within the EU in theory only.  Ad hoc task forces and working groups have been successful, especially in organized crime and art theft matters.  In the counterterrorism realm however, the intelligence is often fragmented, stove-piped or subject to an excessive amount of bureaucratic meddling to be truly of value operationally or on a long-term, sustained basis.  Significantly, there is no established, multi national police agency with a unified, operational chain of command that can be deployed at a moment’s notice.

Europe must overcome these hurdles if it is to reduce the liklihood of further terror attacks while maintaining its open society.  A mandate to share rather than to withhold information must be adopted.  A multi-national JTTF with an operational, investigative role and participation from all member states is step one.  Its permanent staffing and funding must not be in dispute.  Europol, little more than a glorified Interpol at this point, could be put to greater use as a fusion center used to integrate, analyze and disseminate intel throughout the block and to feed potential cases to the JTTF for initiation.

The above effort may require the approval of each of the 28 national governments representing EU members.  But there is no real choice-it must be done.  If internal borders are in effect no longer in existence, then a common operating picture and level playing field among EU police agencies must evolve and become a reality.  It will have a distinctive European character and the FBI-inspired JTTF may not be the model evenutally adopted.  It is a model however which has been successful in the US and has broadly increased analytical thinking and force readiness.  Its unique character and composition have enabled investigators nationwide to “connect the dots”.  The lack of resources argument no longer works-all terorrism related intel must be vetted on a priority basis.  A cultural heritage theft case, while important, must take a back seat to a threat against the homeland.

While it is not a magic bullet, it is worth considering.  A European JTTF just might work in Europe too!

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According to Joan Lowy of The Associated Press, the proposal would include increasing government “viper teams” that are used to search suspicious passengers before screening. The goal in the new initiative would be to increase the number of teams from 30 to 60.

In addition, the senators will request more federal grants to aid in the training of law enforcement officers for possible terrorist attacks on at airports, train stations and other transportation hubs that are considered “soft targets.”

The new proposals are part of additions being made to an aviation policy bill under consideration, which would also allow Transportation Security Administration officials to access to additional terrorism-related and criminal records databases.

The aviation policy bill being considered also addresses the issues with slow signup rates for the TSA PreCheck program, the Federal Aviation Administration, usage of drones and the overflow of common airline fees.

Chairman of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Sen. John Thune, R-S.D. told The Associated Press that he believes the security proposals should have been part of a separate bill, but he didn’t say whether or not he would oppose the aviation bill.

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         After the horrible terrorist attacks in Paris and a few weeks later, in San Bernardino, law enforcement officers and intelligence officials around the world are understandably concerned about possible future attacks.  These public servants sacrifice immensely, doing their best every day to try and keep us safe.  Similar to the weather forecaster, they arrive at educated and insightful conclusions about future crime and terrorism trends using various tools at their disposal.  Their tools, including intelligence from a variety of sources, are sophisticated.  They try to cover all the bases, but unlike baseball, this game has more than just three.

Intelligence gaps will always be a part of the equation when strategizing in counterterrorism circles and those that are charged with its analysis are handicapped without regular access to well-placed sources, those with the right “access”.  Pressing intelligence needs today may include detailed information about Isis adherents, the strength of Isis forces, outside support to the group, including financing as well as vulnerabilities and motivations of members.  Significantly, after the above-mentioned attacks, intelligence priorities certainly include reliable information on radicalized individuals posing as refugees heading to Europe.  Similarly, heavy emphasis is undoubtedly being placed on visa scams and suspect sham marriages, especially between Westerners and those coming from unstable regions.

But all the well-placed human and technical source-derived intelligence is incomplete without the assistance of the public.  The phrase and the meaning of “see something, say something”, have never been more important than they are today.  What appears to be suspicious or unusual activity as observed by a reasonable citizen with good intentions may well be that key grain of intel that police or the FBI needed to solve a case or to prevent an act of terror.  It may also be the initial lead law enforcement receives on a heretofore unknown attempt to violate the law or to threaten the homeland.

Hence, the assistance of the public in thwarting terrorist attacks is crucial.  For that reason, we encourage all citizens to report what appears to them to be suspicious activity.  It may turn out to be nothing, but as long as the citizen’s reporting of such activity is done in good faith, no harm, no foul.

Remember that your local police department and the FBI can take reports of suspicious activity and do just that on a daily basis.  There is also the “terrorist liaison officer”, or “TLO” program, a highly successful collaboration between agencies through which state and local officers, often assigned to a local precinct and working on the street, report suspect information of a homeland security nature.  The information then goes “up the chain” and is analyzed and vetted by a regional intelligence center or Joint Terrorism Task Force.  If the activity is deemed to be a credible threat, investigators are assigned.  If it gets “washed out” as nothing, at least it was reported and the data contained in the report is retained for future reference.

A good example of reporting done by a TLO could be as follows:  A local police officer is interviewing bank employees after a robbery or attempted robbery.  After finishing up, he exits the bank and proceeds to his vehicle.  In checking his environs, the officer notices an individual in plain clothes who has jumped the fence separating the street from a public utility-controlled canal.  The individual accesses a control box while looking around.  He then slams the box shut, hops the fence and speeds away from the area in an unmarked vehicle.

The activity that the officer observed may not be illegal.  Accessing a utility box within a controlled access area of a canal may be a legitimate activity of the operating authority.  But based on the officer’s experience, the fact that the person he observed was not wearing the utility’s uniform, and was not driving the company van seemed strange.  Furthermore, speeding away from the scene was also unusual.  The officer promptly accesses a dedicated form and possibly dedicated, secure on-line database and files a “suspicious activity report”, or SAR.  The process of vetting and corroboration then begins.

Although the average citizen does not have access to the law enforcement database for filing a SAR, different departments and jurisdictions have made it very easy for the public to report suspicious activity.  Various “tip” lines are available through local police departments and all federal law enforcement agencies.  Furthermore, a citizen can call his or her local authorities and ask to speak to a TLO.  Better to report the information than to sit on it, thinking that it was probably nothing.  Let the professionals decide and above all, do not conduct investigation on your own if you are not a sworn law enforcement officer.  Not only could it be dangerous, it just might be illegal as well.

What are some of the suspicious activity indicators that might presage terrorist activity?  Our website will publish a list of them in January.  In the meantime, send us your comments on this article through the portal on the homepage of our website.

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While government officials and intelligence personnel put together the sequence of events leading up to and including the November 13 attacks, we note for our part that the assailants were quite sophisticated and made use of heavy weaponry as well as suicide vests or belts and possibly had access to a rocket launcher.  It is also noteworthy that the group, composed of at least eight men with other co conspirators, incuding women identified after the fact, exhibited sound operational security and tactics.  Security measures included the use of “dark web” communications, target casing, throw-away phones and abandoned vehicles.  The entire operation was likely highly compartmentalized.

Regarding tactics, the high powered weaponry and suicide vests, together with multiple operational teams spread out through the city, virtually guaranteed the group would meet its objective of causing great loss of life and instilling a real sense of fear among the population.

Whether the Paris terrorists’ use of such weapons, security and tactics  is a one-off event or is a harbinger of operational methodolgy for future attacks is not known at this time.  However, it would not be surprising or unusual for aspiring terrorists to adopt “tried and true” methodologies to heighten their chances of “success”.  Success of course, in the sick mind of a terrorist, equates to more carnage, victims and bloodshed.

Of the eight known assailants that killed at least 130 people on the evening of November 13, those that made their way into the Bataclan venue sprayed hundreds of rounds indiscriminantly and subsequently detonated suicide vests  Another assailant was stopped just outside the Stade de France and detonated his explosives jacket, killing himself immediately.  An explosives vest was also used by an as yet unidentified person when confronted by French police during the raids in the Saint Denis suburb in the north of Paris on November 18.

The assembly and use of explosives vests is complex and meticulous, according to sources.  Their use shows a level of expertise not commonly seen outside of the Middle East.  The preparation and distribution of at least six of them in Paris required painstaking planning and significant time.

“A suicide vest requires a munitions specialist.  To make a reliable and effective explosive is not something anyone can do”, said a former French intelligence official to Agence France Presse.

An inexperienced weapons or explosives handler would have a hard time creating an explosive vest that would be stable enough for a person to wear.  It must not detonate by accident and it must also be concealable, added the intel source.

The use of at least half a dozen vests suggests that the munitions specialist is still alive and at large.  The specialist possesses a great deal of technical skill which is not easily replaceable.  He is likely considered to be too valuable to sacrifice in a suicide bombing.  The unstable explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was the explosive used in the attacks and in the Saint Denis raid, a fact that suggests the devices were created in France and were not transported a great distance.

The high-powered Kalashnikov was also the rifle of choice in last week’s carnage and we note that it was also used in the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January.  This does not mean there were operational links between the terrorists who perpetrated Charlie Hebdo and those who created a virtual war zone in Paris last week.  In fact, none has been confirmed.  It does mean that French gun laws-among the toughest in Europe-are ineffective at least in part.  The lack of border controls within the Schengen area and the widespread availability of weapons left over from the Balkan wars in southeastern Europe facilitate arms trafficking and availability on the continent.  Organized crime elements have long had access to such weapons and now it appears that terrorists do as well.

The Paris attacks are sophisticated also for their spectacular nature, which could not have been achieved without a great deal of planning, operational security and compartmentalization of information.  There were at least five crime scenes in Paris: Bataclan, Stade de France, Le Carillon, Le Comptoir Voltaire and Le Petit Cambodge.  Terrorists achieved their objective at four but were refused entry into the stadium.  The simultaneous execution of these attacks required a great deal of planning.  After the attacks, they disposed of a cell phone-later recovered by investigators-and dumped a car on the outskirts of Paris.  Both the phone and the car have provided extensive leads, but that is all after the fact now-reactive mode.

Operational security during the planning stage seems to have been tight.  Neither French nor other intelligence or police services detected the attacks and thus failed to neutralize an active cell of extremists.  That necessarily means that the perpetrators were not talking, emailing or meeting with a great deal of frequency.

In spite of the terrorists’ security consciousness, one cannot overlook the missed signals, disjointed intelligence and “failure to connect the dots” that seem to have beset European services leading up to the attacks.  Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud, killed in the St. Denis raid, slipped back into Europe from Syria undetected even though he was wanted by Belgian authorities.  Then there’s Ismail Omar Mostefai, the Bataclan suicide bomber.  He is suspected of travelling to and from Syria in 2013 and 2014.  Turkish authorities notified the French in December of 2014 and again last June about his suspected travels, for which he made use of his French passport.  The French never responded, according to a source in Turkish law enforcement.

Finally, it appears they kept their plans to themselves.  Talkative terrorists can face exposure through their misplaced trust.  Terrorists and criminals often confide in an apparent friend only to find out later that he or she was secretly informing police of the group’s intentions and activities.  With so many people involved in these attacks, it is extraordinary that no one gave it up-even unwittingly-before execution.  There were clear signs, but much like during the months before the 09/11 attacks in the US, the intelligence was not properly exploited.

Perhaps the most significant operational advantage that the terrorists had in this case was their freedom of movement throughout the Schengen area.  Let us remember that so far, all of the identified attackers were either French or Belgian citizens.  They therefore travelled on EU passports and did not face customs or immigration controls within the block.  They would however be required to produce their passports upon reentry into Schengen, such as overland from Turkey or from a point in the Middle East via a scheduled airline flight.  System failures at all levels contributed to the worst act of violence in France since World War II.

There are too many “take aways” to enumerate here and we are still in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.  However, it is safe to say that the attacks will cause a rethinking-and possibly retooling-of the European unity and integration model.  They will also inevitably force police and intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic to adjust their tactics in order to keep up with and anticipate terrorists’ use of new technologies and weaponry.  As they do, we can expect a lively legal debate on civil liberties and freedom of movement and association.

Seems like 09/11 all over.

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MOGADISHU, Somalia — Islamist militants stormed a popular hotel in the heart of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, on Sunday, blowing up the front gate with a car bomb, shooting guests and hotel workers, and then battling with security forces from the hotel’s rooftop for several hours.

Somali government officials said at least 14 people at the Sahafi Hotel were killed in the attack, which was immediately — and gleefully — claimed by the Shabab militant group.

If there is one hotel everyone knows in Mogadishu, it is the Sahafi. Warlords and militants alike used to hang out and plot schemes in the lounge and courtyard while sipping grapefruit juice and pulling apart camel meat steaks.

Sahafi means journalist in Arabic, and for years the hotel has served as the gateway to one of the world’s most dangerous countries for foreign journalists, aid workers and the rare brave businessman. Even in the hardest times, the staff managed to provide clean rooms and good food. Lobster was one of the house specialties, served alongside mountains of French fries. Recently, the hotel was a popular rendezvous spot for officials from Somalia’s fledgling government.

Around dawn on Sunday, witnesses said, a car rammed into the Sahafi’s front gate and immediately exploded. Several Shabab fighters then scrambled into the hotel, shooting guests. A second car bomb exploded two hours later, wounding several journalists and other people who had rushed to the hotel, located at a busy traffic circle in central Mogadishu, to see what had happened. One young journalist, Mustaf Abdinur Safaana, a freelance TV cameraman, was killed.

Among the other dead, witnesses said, were a Somali lawmaker, a Somali Army general and the hotel’s owner, Abdirashid Ilgayte, who used to welcome guests into his office just off the hotel’s entrance and regale them with stories of violence and intrigue from Somalia’s darkest days.

“The Shabab fighters seized the hotel and controlled it for several hours,” said Mohamed Ali, a taxi driver who was outside the Sahafi while the fighting was going on.

The Shabab remain a potent force in Somalia. They have lost many fighters and much of their territory, pushed out by a coalition of troops from neighboring African countries. But they are still highly dangerous and considered one of Al Qaeda’s most murderous offshoots. They seemed to have perfected mass murder on the cheap, including an attack on a university in Kenya in April in which four young Shabab gunmen killed more than 140 people.

“Mujahedeen entered and took over Sahafi Hotel where enemies lived,” Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, the Shabab’s military operations spokesman, told Reuters on Sunday, using a common term for Islamic guerrilla fighters.

Multipronged attacks on hotels have become one of the hallmarks of the Shabab, who have killed scores in Mogadishu in recent years by overwhelming security guards at the gates and then sending in suicidal fighters. The Shabab have vowed to turn Somalia into a pure Islamic state; most of their victims have been Somali Muslims.

Photographs taken by bystanders on Sunday showed a huge hole punched through the Sahafi’s third floor, along with streams of black smoke uncoiling into the sky. Rubble was scattered for blocks. Witnesses said several members of the hotel staff had been hiding in locked rooms, calling for help, as Shabab fighters stalked the smoke filled corridors, looking for more victims.

By 11 a.m., African Union troops in Somalia, along with government forces, overpowered the attackers and shot them dead. Somali government officials said there were seven attackers.

Mogadishu may be safer than it used to be, but it is still not safe. The Shabab once controlled much of the city, bullwhipping women and terrorizing the population by enforcing a harsh version of Islamic law. But even after being pushed out by African Union troops, Shabab fighters have shown they can strike anywhere at any time.

Somalia’s government tried to play down some of the concerns stirred up by the attack. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia said on Sunday, “We want to confirm that such terrorist acts does not mean Shabab’s revival, but in the contrary shows clear signs that they are in desperate situation.”

Mohammed Ibrahim reported from Mogadishu, and Jeffrey Gettleman from Nairobi, Kenya.

View the original article here.

• While terrorism dominates U.S. political and foreign policy concerns, the threat posed by domestic gun violence—from a statistical standpoint—far outweighs the threat of terrorism within the United States
• With over 30,000 gun-related deaths a year (less than half of which are murders, and the rest suicides and accidental deaths), the United States experiences a death toll of ten 9/11 attacks each year from gun violence
• High-profile shootings such as the on-air murder of two journalists in Virginia, or the execution-style killing of a Houston police officer, provide only the briefest of spotlights on America’s daily death toll from gun violence
• As noted last week in the New York Times, there have been more domestic gun deaths in the United States since 1968 than in all of America’s wars since the Declaration of Independence.

Last week’s murder of two journalists on live television in Virginia, and the execution-style murder of a deputy sheriff in Texas, shined a brief spotlight on what is a tragic and frequent occurrence in the United States. With only 5% of the world’s population but approximately 50% of its privately owned firearms, the United States is awash in both guns and gun-related deaths. While the fear of terrorism drives foreign policy in terms of priorities and threat matrices, the fact is that for the average American, terrorism fortunately remains a threat far more feared than realized.

The threat of gun violence, however, is fully realized; more than 30,000 Americans are killed every year by guns. Mass shootings understandably garner the most attention, but the vast majority of victims die alone, through suicide or murder. Since the June 2015 Charleston church shootings, more people have been killed by guns in America than on 9/11—the event that has become the ‘before/after’ for American security policy. As Nicholas Kristof noted in the New York Times last week, more Americans have been killed domestically by guns since 1968 than in all the wars and conflicts fought by the U.S. since 1776. The efforts to convincingly frame the carnage are as endless as they are ineffective. The issue of gun violence in America defies creative comparison.

From the killing of 20 young children in a Connecticut elementary school (among the total of 27 killed that day) to a mass murder in a church in Charleston; from a movie theater in Colorado to a military office in Chattanooga, there is evidently no outrage shocking enough to spur a sustained national discussion on ways to alter the trend lines. Guns play a unique role in the killing of Americans, yet the dialogue surrounding the threat of domestic gun violence remains paralyzed. While other comparable threats are analyzed and addressed, gun violence is alone ignored. The sheer variety of ways in which Americans die by gunfire has rendered it apparently not just unsolvable but also unmentionable. Murders make headlines, but suicides devastate far more American families. The immediacy of an available gun is coupled with the permanence of its firing. Gun violence’s victims may vary, but the cause of death is consistent, as compared to other developed nations.

The focus on terrorism is a comforting ‘us vs. the other’ fight that is easily framed, unlike the unframable threat of American gun violence. Terrorism is certainly a global issue—as people in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, and across the world can sadly attest. Yet the fact remains that every year gun violence in America—murderous, suicidal, or accidental—kills tens of thousands and yet the threat remains hopelessly uncountered.

The suspect entered the train car carrying an AK-47 and a handgun, and “I looked over at Spencer and said, ‘Let’s go,’” said Alek Skarlatos, identified as an Oregon National Guardsman returning from Afghanistan. “And he jumped, I followed behind him by about three seconds. Spencer got the guy first, grabbed the guy by the neck, I grabbed the handgun,” said Mr. Skarlatos, referring to Spencer Stone, a friend and member of the Air Force. The Pentagon confirmed their identities.

Mr. Stone was severely cut by the suspect in the neck and hand and is receiving treatment at a hospital in northern France, though his injuries are not life threatening. An amateur video taken in the immediate aftermath shows the suspect on the ground with his legs in the air, his hands tied, while another man – apparently Mr. Stone, kneels shirtless and evidently in pain. Groans are heard, and a voice saying, “Dude, I tried to shoot him.”

The suspect wounded several passengers before the Americans subdued him and their quick action averted what officials said could have been a bloodbath. On Saturday morning, the French press, government and social media praised their actions and President Obama also hailed their bravery. They were decorated with an honor by the French city of Arras, where the train, an Amsterdam-Paris express, pulled in after the incident.

The suspect, identified as a 26-year-old man of Moroccan origin known to Spanish authorities as a terrorism suspect, was being interrogated by French police in the Paris region. French media reported that he denied having terrorist aims, and merely intended to rob the passengers. But his arsenal —several guns, a sack of ammunition, a sharp blade —suggested otherwise.

At least two other passengers were also involved in restraining the suspect after the two servicemen subdued him. One of them, Chris Norman, a British businessman interviewed on television, said: “the guy actually came up, he pulled out a cutter, started cutting Spencer. He cut Spencer behind the neck, he nearly cut his thumb off, we eventually got him under control. It could have been a real carnage.”

Passengers spoke of hearing gunshots as the train was traveling through the countryside, and of seeing bloodied individuals rolling out into the grass when the train lurched to a stop during a chaotic few minutes of shooting.

France, on high alert after deadly terrorist attacks this year, immediately sent Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve to Arras, where he commended the Americans who had helped “neutralize this extremely violent passenger,” praising them for their “great bravery” and saying that “without their sang-froid we could have been confronted with a terrible tragedy.”

Police sources quoted in the French news media said the Americans thought they had heard the suspect loading ammunition into a weapon in one of the toilets and confronted him as he exited. The attack occurred on Belgian territory as the train was hurtling at top speed toward Paris.

It was not immediately clear how the Americans had concluded from the noise that the assailant had been loading a weapon, suggesting that they may have observed him acting suspiciously before he entered the bathroom. It also was unclear how many weapons the gunman was carrying. French news accounts said he was armed with an automatic pistol, a Kalashnikov rifle and a knife.

French Twitter messages surged with praise for the Americans. “Enormous respect for the two American soldiers who prevented a terrorist attack,” said @Math2ieu. Others called for the pair to be awarded the Legion of Honor.

The Belgian prime minister, Charles Michel, said on Twitter, “I condemn the terrorist attack,” and expressed his sympathy for the victims.

A French actor, Jean-Hugues Anglade, who appeared in the 1986 film “Betty Blue,” was aboard the train. Mr. Cazeneuve confirmed French news media reports that the actor was slightly injured.

In an indication of how seriously the French were taking the assault, President François Hollande issued a statement Friday night saying that “everything is being done” to determine what had happened on the train, having handed the investigation over to the country’s top antiterrorism investigators.

President Obama was briefed on the train assault and how it was foiled, administration officials said.

“Echoing the statements of French authorities, the president expressed his profound gratitude for the courage and quick thinking of several passengers, including U.S. service members, who selflessly subdued the attacker,” the White House Press Office said in a statement. “While the investigation into the attack is in its early stages, it is clear that their heroic actions may have prevented a far worse tragedy. We will remain in close contact with French authorities as the investigation proceeds.”

The high-speed train is popular for travel between France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. It is used extensively by businesspeople, diplomats, European Union officials and tourists.

Unlike the Eurostar train between Paris and London, however, luggage does not pass through X-ray machines or other forms of screening.

Plainclothes security officers are said to be frequently aboard the trains. On the platforms of the Gare du Nord in Paris, where the trains arrive and depart, uniformed police officers are often visible. But safeguarding the international service is challenging because the trains leave almost every hour.

France’s sensitivities to terrorist assaults have been heightened since January, when Islamic militants killed 17 in attacks in and around Paris. In June, an extremist beheaded his boss in southern France and tried to blow up a gas plant.

French lawmakers have passed tough surveillance laws in the wake of these attacks, and the anti-immigrant, far right National Front party has seen its popularity surge.

Reporting was contributed by Aurelien Breeden, Lilia Blaise, Elian Peltier and Marlise Simons from Paris; Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear from Washington; and Rick Gladstone from New York.

View the original article here.