But rather than dwell on the seemingly endless armed conflict, it’s worthwhile to take a look at the hotel bombing and emphasize once again the critical need for hotel operators to implement effective and smarter security controls aimed at detecting and neutralizing non-traditional or “asymmetric” threats to the sector. It is not enough to erect barriers outside the entrance or to have guests pass through a magnetometer, however inconvenient that may be. A wholesale rethinking of hotel security practices is necessary. Such re-crafting of the process cannot be accomplished using a “one size fits all” approach; rather, a carefully calibrated protocol must be established and implemented for each property bearing in mind the threat environment in which the establishment operates.
Last September’s mass shooting at the Mandalay Bay Resort in Las Vegas was a clarion call for the hospitality sector to take a more proactive approach to security. In the case of Las Vegas, or other tourist and convention oriented cities in the US and Europe, current protocols need to be strengthened and non-traditional measures need to be adopted. A good look at who is checking in-what is he or she about and does the potential guest mesh with the established demographic-should be priority questions. In other words, if you operate a five-star hotel and charge close to $400 per night, should you be concerned about a 21-year-old man who checks in alone? What about a single female of the same age group? And a group of student back-packers?
The answer in our view is while no particular concerns may be apparent at the time of check-in, a person who clearly looks out of place in your property may be a good candidate for a little extra screening. What type of screening can be accomplished to allay concerns about the person? Consider adopting some of the following measures:
Finally, if you do observe or otherwise detect suspicious activity, the hotel has the right to take quick action to ensure the safety of guests and employees. An innocent person who is expelled from the hotel might be able to raise a valid claim against the property, but a reasonable expulsion of someone who just does not seem “right” or is acting in a way incompatible with security may make the difference between a safe stay for all and a tragedy of immense proportions.
There is no hard and fast, right or wrong protocol in implementing non-traditional and proactive security measures at hospitality locations. Those that are most appropriate will be dictated by events on the ground, intelligence gathered, local and national law enforcement liaison and a good deal of thinking outside the box. The important thing is to not rely exclusively on barriers and door locks. As the threat evolves, so must your security protocols.
]]>We’ve been here before. We’ve had terrorist attacks or mass shootings involving aircraft, skyscrapers, military bases and houses of worship. Each event spurs honest conversation on enhancing security. But a successful attack on a soft target, like a school or hotel, incurs a level consternation in the public that is characterized by an extreme sense of vulnerability as well as by the accompanying impulse to stay away from certain attractions and locations. Both have tragic consequences, but security protocols at each are very different and are a function of the known or assumed threat that the particular venue faces. What is the formula? How do we know what the threat is? From where do we get reliable intelligence? Once we have the intel, how do we use it in a proactive manner?
There are no easy answers. Truth is, hardening a venue – making it less attractive to a would-be terrorist – is a dynamic process that requires a combination of robust physical security measures as well as a reliable stream of intelligence, together with analysis that puts the intel into proper context. Armed with this information, the security professional can take proactive measures designed to enhance venue safety and security. Intelligence is the crucial first step from which all other measures flow.
Those traditional threats that hotel security personnel have trained for over decades – intruders, assaults, theft of merchandise or money, organized crime infiltration of casinos and money laundering – are relatively easy to address when compared with the monumental responsibility of preventing a terrorist attack or a mass casualty shooting on premises. It is precisely this asymmetric threat of the “active shooter” or terrorist that needs to be addressed. How is it that a mass shooting can take place at a luxury hotel when one bears in mind the enormous security apparatus on site?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that no location can be made 100% secure. The other key part is the realization that intelligence analysis and asymmetric threat detection on site were not as robust or as developed as they should have been, in the case of the Mandalay Bay. This likely goes for most venues as well, since intelligence and its consequent analysis require specialized personnel and a constant reevaluation or updating of intel requirements and gaps. They also require management that “gets” it and is willing to dedicate funds it.
Some things to bear in mind when devising and implementing asymmetric threat protocols in a venue such as a hotel:
-Trash the notion that your threat is likely going to come from common criminals, money launderers and thieves. It might, but you need to quantify the threat from other elements as well;
-Rid yourself of the mindset that “it won’t happen here”. You don’t know that and the events in Las Vegas (and in Mumbai in 2008) have shown that it CAN happen at your location.
-If you say, “we know what our threat is”, how do you know that? Have you been accumulating accurate, reliable intelligence to justify that assumption?
-Remember that trade associations, unions and sector-specific safety organizations accumulate a wealth of information about trends and incidents that take place at public venues. Make sure to avail yourself of membership and do not rely solely on one organization for all your threat info or intelligence.
-Meet frequently with your local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. They can provide you with updated threat information and trends affecting your business segment. They might also be able to suggest some security enhancements for your property.
-Be proactive. Do not wait for the threat to come to you and then react. Take measures to protect the venue from these uncommon or non-traditional threats. Effective measures can deter attack, as the attackers pass you by and go on to a more vulnerable target.
“Active Shooter” preparedness training is essential for public venue security personnel, but it must be accompanied by updated intelligence.
Like this article? Subscribe to the Security Strategies Today newsletter, “Like” them on Facebook and follow them on Twitter @securitystrateg.
]]>Political wrangling will inevitably take place, but hopefully some effective measures will be adopted to at least deter future would-be terrorists from using their vehicles to mow down civilians. In the interim, what can we do in the hospitality sector to reduce the threat that our colleagues travelling on business or our assigned personnel in higher-risk locations face? The random nature of a vehicle-borne attack and the unpredictability of it are at the heart of the issue, but some measures in fact can be taken to lessen our risk.
First and foremost, keep informed of the security environment in the country or region you are visiting. Do this through a regular review of related material in newspapers and magazines. In addition, the US State Department, UK Foreign Office and other government websites routinely publish country security status updates that are specifically designed to aid the public in travel planning and safety. If a respected government agency recommends that the public defer all but essential travel, then it might be wise to heed that recommendation. That may be an extreme measure, but remember that governments acquire and assess intelligence from a wide variety of sources and boil it down into useful analysis. We must take such analysis seriously, even if we may never be privy to the source(s) of the intelligence.
Secondly, if you are in a foreign country, it’s wise to place a call to your country’s embassy or consulate for the latest information on the security situation. In rapidly developing circumstances, embassies may be in possession of updated intelligence furnished by the host government. This vital information may not have been previously disseminated and can serve as the basis for more informed decision-making in an evolving situation.
Naturally, the most iconic locations draw the most attention from those intent on perpetrating a mass casualty attack. The Champs Elysees, London Bridge, Times Square, Las Ramblas and other landmarks-such as the World Trade Center-all come to mind. But avoiding these areas does not mean a visitor or resident will remain safe. Terrorists planning an attack often have a plan B: If the primary target becomes too difficult to strike, they will find another, “softer” target to hit. So, we’re talking about reducing-but not eliminating-risk. Keep your wits about you, plan alternate routes and ensure to identify possible safe havens, both in areas you may visit and in and around your hotel or workplace.
The fact remains that not much can be done to stop an individual hell-bent on wreaking havoc through the use of a vehicle. Let’s summarize for a moment the most salient vehicle-borne attacks in Europe and the US:
July 14, 2016 – 31-year-old French citizen Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel used a rented truck to barrel down a pedestrian street in Nice, France on Bastille Day and killed 87 people. This attack proved to be the most deadly, not only because of the size and weight of the truck, but also due to the fact that the front end had been modified and fitted with a heavy metal plate, designed specifically to maximize its destructive impact.
November 28, 2016 – A student at Ohio State University inspired by ISIS propaganda drove his car into several pedestrians at the school before crashing it and jumping out to continue assaulting victims with a knife. At least 13 people were injured in the attack. The attacker was shot dead by police.
December 19, 2016 – A hijacked truck is driven through a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 people and injuring 56 others. The perpetrator was later killed in a shootout with police.
March 22, 2017 – A British man barrels into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge and Bridge Street in London, killing four and injuring more than 50 others. The attacker then crashed the car into a fence at the Palace of Westminster and fatally stabbed a police officer before being shot to death.
June, 2017– Eleven people were injured when Darren Osborne, a self-radicalized anti-Muslim extremist, drove a rented van into a crowd of worshippers leaving London’s Finsbury Park Mosque as Muslims finished Ramadan evening prayers.
Also in June, 2017– Three radicalized British residents of North African descent drove into pedestrians on London Bridge before launching a knife attack in Borough Market, killing 8 and wounding another 48.
August, 2017– A neo-Nazi white supremacist, identified as James Alex Fields, Jr. is alleged to have driven his vehicle into a crowd of demonstrators who were protesting a white supremacist march in Charlottesville, Virginia. One woman was killed and several people were injured.
Preventing this type of attack is a difficult task for law enforcement inasmuch as it is a low-tech, easy and efficient way to cause mass casualties. Significantly, the on-line AQAP magazine Inspire urged its followers to use vehicles as weapons and to turn commonly-used items, such as household cleaning agents, or chemicals, into improvised explosive devices. The low-tech nature of the operation is crucial to its success. The fewer people involved in an operation and the reduced need to carry out long and complex logistics in preparation for the attack lessen the risk of its detection. In the case of this Spanish ISIS cell which perpetrated Thursday’s attack, there were at least eight people involved who conspired to commit an even more spectacular attack using large improvised explosive devices. Their preferred method involved readily available portable gas tanks, widely used in Spain for cooking and home heating. Nothing noteworthy or suspicious in their acquisition and no special permit is required.
Of course, the use of a vehicle as a weapon and the targeting of a tourist area present a quandary that is not easily addressed. Law enforcement can deploy additional stanchions and other physical barriers leading up to pedestrian walkways or popular attractions. Authorities can also strategically-and on the spur of the moment-deploy spike strips to slow down a vehicle and render it immobile in a matter of seconds. However, the crucial intelligence indicating when and where such an attack will occur would still be lacking. Even with a sophisticated human intelligence component in its investigative arsenal, the ubiquitous nature of vehicles and the spontaneity with which they can be used as weapons would leave law enforcement ill-equipped to detect almost all of them in the planning stages. No easy solution for this one.
]]>One of the most searing images of 09/11 is the progressive collapse of the upper floors of both World Trade Center towers and the “pancaking” of the floors on top of each other. Various theories have been proffered by design and construction experts on the exact sequence of events that triggered the collapse. However, all agree that the “inner core” of the building most likely could have withstood collapse if it had been constructed of reinforced concrete, rather than steel. In fact, the US Institute of Standards and Technology (IST), in its final report on the collapse of the Twin Towers, noted that alternate weight bearing and weight distribution technologies as well as the use of more robust fire resistant materials in construction would contribute to enhancing structural integrity in a fire or dynamic impact to a high rise building.
It is clear that 09/11 ushered in a sea change in the thought process, design and architecture of skyscrapers, defined in this article as those structures exceeding 1250 feet (381 meters) in height. One of the most promising developments since that tragedy is the use of Ultra High-Performance Concrete (UHPC). The material is fire resistant due to the inclusion of polypropylene fibers and provides for greater load bearing and shifting capabilities in the event of aircraft impact or significant ground movement due to earthquake. It is up to 1,000 times more durable than standard construction concrete and lasts 2-3 times longer. Its compressive strength is outstanding and due to its low porosity, it is resistant to cracking and water infiltration. Its use in the construction of bridges, both in the US and Europe, has taken hold and various versions of UHPC are being tested for use in high rise construction.
The fire suppression systems in the WTC were in large part rendered inoperable due to the extremely high temperatures caused by burning aviation fuel and other volatile chemicals. In an effort to enhance autonomous on-site fire suppression, the builders of new superstructures are encasing sprinkler mechanisms in concrete and adding high capacity exhaust and ventilation systems. Laminated, heat-resistant glass is being incorporated into window design. The architectural firm which designed the new One World Trade Center, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, has added chemical and biological agent air filters and increased the width of escape staircases by 50%. In addition, it has added an emergency staircase for the exclusive use of first responders. In an effort to impart clear guidance to building occupants in an evacuation, the New York City Fire Department, for its part, will now take over the building’s PA system upon arrival, thus avoiding possible conflicting guidance given by the building’s security personnel and first responders. It is noted that on 09/11, may occupants of the Twin Towers returned to their office space after beginning evacuation inasmuch as the pre-recorded building security announcement instructed them to do so. This caused an unknown number of people to perish.
A school of thought has emerged that the use of elevators to escape a building fire should not be automatically prohibited. In fact, both in Europe and in China, service elevators specifically designed for the use of first responders in an evacuation are being designed. This would assist firefighters in extinguishing a blaze on the upper floors and would facilitate the arrival of emergency equipment on site. Response time would be shortened and occupants would not have to wait hours in smoke-filled or burning floors for help to arrive. The elevators and their mechanical and electrical components are designed using fire resistant materials and are powered by a dedicated electricity source. Encased in the reinforced concrete core, the elevators can also be used by properly trained personnel to facilitate emergency evacuation.
Obviously, 09/11 was the catalyst for significant enhancements in building construction, but one must not forget the need for security safeguards at ingress and egress as well as the need to train. In the US, the visitor to a high rise is now routinely challenged should the person not possess a card key allowing access to the building and even the elevators. Turnstyle-like barriers are in place recording each and every swipe of an access pass and concrete barriers are visible on the building’s exterior. Fire drills have been made mandatory both by building owners and by city officials and sprinkler systems and alarms have become so advanced that fire departments can receive electronic notification of the exact floor and location of a hazard through a signal sent from the device to the department’s dispatch. Clearly, these are positive developments that will contribute to first responder efficiency and occupant safety. Tragically, many of these cutting edge enhancements were not in place in London and what was available was not maintained or properly used. Additionally, a retrofit of existing buildings is not always possible.
The US firm that supplied the cladding for the Grenfell Tower, Arconic, said it was said discontinuing sales of Reynobond PE for tower blocks due to “issues” identified by the fire, which is feared to have killed at least 79. The government of UK Prime Minister Theresa May said 75 buildings in 26 council areas had now failed fire safety tests – every one tested so far. Tower managers from across the UK are being urged to send in samples of their building’s cladding components for combustibility tests. Ironically, Ms. May’s government, while urging further testing, acknowledges that it did not propery define the degree of “combustibility” that exterior cladding was required to withstand when it promulgated its latest rules, which are widely thought to be insufficient and poorly monitored. There is no excuse, however, for fire alarms systems that were defective or for a building design that allowed for one fire escape staircase only.
The London Grenfell Tower fire shows that in spite of existing, advanced standards for building construction and fire suppression, if the political will and the financial support do not exist, such improvements are little more than paper changes. In London as in New York, the results were tragic. The challenge for modern societies is to ensure that safety, both in design, construction and in emergency procedures, keeps apace with new technology. City managers and councils must ensure that building fire codes are written reflecting the incorporation of the most cutting-edge technologies. Advanced and recurrent training for first responders and building occupants must not be an afterthought and government agencies charged with oversight must be held accountable as well.
]]>According to the document, over the past three years at least 173 people have been killed and more than 700 wounded in 17 ramming attacks around the world. Of these, 13 resulted in fatalities. Nine of the 17 attacks were carried out in the past 10 months. The most devastating attack was carried out last Bastille Day (July 14) in Nice, France, when a radicalized individual drove a commercial truck at a high speed along the pedestrians-only Promenade des Anglais, killing 87 people. The assailant was shot dead by police. Other vehicle ramming attacks in Europe include the December, 2016 attack at a crowded Berlin Christmas market in which 12 people were killed and this year’s London attack as well as a less publicized one in Stockholm, Sweden.
“No community, large or small, rural or urban, is immune to attacks of this kind by organized or ‘lone wolf’ terrorists,” read the TSA report.
Indeed, vehicle ramming attacks have occurred in far flung places as well, most notably in Urumqi, China, when two extremists rammed into a crowd at an outdoor market, killing 43 people. The assailants also threw improvised explosive devices at the victims during the chaos. The vehicles then collided and exploded.
The jump in the frequency of attacks appears to coincide with ISIS leader Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani’s call in September 2014 for adherents to kill “infidels” by any means possible, including, “smash(ing) his head with a rock, or slaughter(ing) him with a knife or run(ning) him over with your car.”
TSA assesses that venues most at risk of attack include locations where “large numbers of people congregate, including parades and other celebratory gatherings, sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers.” In addition, “commercial vehicles — distinguished by their large size, weight and carrying capacity — present an especially attractive mechanism for vehicle ramming attacks because of the ease with which they can penetrate security barriers and the large-scale damage they can inflict on people and infrastructure.”
The ease with which an attack can be perpetrated using a vehicle is obviously one of the main reasons that terrorists have opted for this method over the past few years. There is no telling when a person could suddenly rent or purchase a vehicle-or commandeer one-and use it as a killing machine. In addition, such an attack requires little if any planning and can be carried out by one person, thereby reducing the ability of law enforcement to detect a plan involving multiple co conspirators. The use of “loan wolves” in perpetrating terrorist attacks is the preferred modus operandi these days, as terrorists seek to move with stealth, avoiding months of planning meetings, email trails and extensive foreign travel.
The report notes that companies operating commercial vehicles and vehicle rental agencies in particular should be alert for any unauthorized modifications. For example, any commercial vehicles with reinforced front fenders or bumpers merit particular attention and operators should notify law enforcement authorities should they discover suspect or sudden modifications.
Rental agencies should make note and alert authorities should potential renters make unusual inquiries about the weight or maximum speed of trucks. Similarly, rental agencies should be alert to patterns of behavior that, although not indicative of impending terrorist activity, could be pursued by terrorists to perpetrate a crime. Such activity may include the presentation of obviously false or forged documentation, rental truck retrieval by one person and subsequent abandonment of the vehicle or return of the vehicle with significant front-end damage. The last example could be a sign of a staged or practice ramming event, a “dry run”.
As always, should a commercial vehicle rental agency or other commercial vehicle operator have additional questions or to report suspect activity, the TSA and the FBI urge you to contact them or your local police department without delay.
]]>One thing is almost universally true in these case
The active shooter, that person who storms into a classroom, cinema, restaurant or house of worship, is most likely suffering from acute mental illness. The mental illness often leads to delusional feelings and a profound sense of victimization. As investigators delve into the shooter’s past to determine just what triggered such violent behavior, the phrases “you did this to me” or “you made me do this” either written or spoken, were articulated by the perpetrator in the days or weeks preceding the killing spree.
We’re not addressing here motivational factors that might have contributed to the violent behavior, such as political, ideological or religious opinions or racial animus, though those are often present as well. In those instances, mental illness may be a secondary factor or not a factor at all. What we are addressing is the emotional component when mental illness severe that beset the shooter and that lead the shooter to often uncontrollable outbursts of violent behavior that culminate in a mass shooting.
Of course, each case is different and no hard and fast rule applies to each mass shooting in the US. But when taken as a whole, we can discern some characteristics of those who perpetrate a mass shooting from a mental health perspective.
In general terms, the perpetrator has suffered from mental illness in the past, whether diagnosed properly or not. What’s more, studies of perpetrators-such as Adam Lanza, the author of the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting-have shown that the mental illness, even if diagnosed, was not treated with correct medical protocols. By this, we mean either accepted clinical practices for treating the illness were not adhered to or the patient himself did not follow the prescribed treatment. In the case of Lanza, both are true. He suffered from untreated Asperger’s syndrome, which is suspected of worsening his mental illness. At the same time, he did not follow the prescribed treatment for his mental illness, once diagnosed.
In the case of Cho Seung Hui, the shooter in the Virginia Tech massacre who killed 31 people, we also see a case of severe mental illness not properly diagnosed. Although he had been counseled in the past about violent outbursts and harassment of other students, his feelings of victimization, made worse by bullying, were manifest during the shooting spree when he railed against everyone associated with him or the university in any way. During the subsequent investigation, police uncovered at least two videos he made of himself. One of the two he apparently recorded for post-incident airing. In that one, he makes it clear that others made him commit the horrific acts that day at the university. “I did not want to do this. You made me do it”, he states.
A couple of other characteristics we often see in the perpetrators of mass shootings are self-isolation, a “loner”, social awkwardness and the inability to develop meaningful relationships with friends or family. Indeed, in many cases a close friend or family member would be one of the first to detect changes in personality that hint at something being awry and thus attempt to force intervention. But all too often, the rage and victimization remain inside, as the eventual shooter is living in a surreal environment, convinced that there is no way out, no escape, from his brutal world unless he lashes out against the very threats that he believes are victimizing him.
There are many other factors that influence a shooter of this type and we do not discount ideology. But it is the leap that the eventual shooter must make that is addressed here. The decision to perpetrate the crime or not is a conscious one and thus the ability of the shooter to make that leap is influenced greatly by his mental state.
In an upcoming letter, we’ll take a look at some of the differences discernible in cases wherein the shooter is acting out of a deeply held ideological conviction as opposed to one who is reacting to years of internalized strife that manifests itself in violence.
(Security Strategies Today offers a one or two day in depth course on preparing your company or workforce in the event of an active shooter incident. The course address both the mindset of the shooter and tactical issues for those caught up in the event. Contact us for a quote.)
Click here for the original article.
]]>With regard to getting through the airport quickly and ensuring you make your flight, take note of these tried and true tips:
Air travel continues to be an attractive target for terrorists but in recent years, airport facilities or other travel infrastructure have figured more prominently since the actual aircraft have been hardened. This year’s attacks in major airports such as Istanbul and Brussels have made this abundantly clear. Passengers and employees were gunned down while waiting in areas accessible to the public, such as the luggage carousel and the check-in line. Furthermore, the November 2015 attacks in Paris included multiple targets, from bars and restaurants to sports venues and a concert hall.
Bottom line is although we cannot take our eyes off aviation and the devastating effects an attack could have on a civilian aircraft, other targets perceived as vulnerable, so called “soft targets”, have been hit with more frequency in the last several years. We note that an exception to this trend was the apparent successful downing by explosive device of a flight by Russian airline Metrojet at its initial cruising altitude en route from Sharm el Sheik, Egypt to St. Petersburg in Russia. The presumed attack occurred in October of 2015. Although Russian and Egyptian authorities play down this prospect in favor of a mid-air structural break-up, forensic examination conducted on the aircraft’s remains shows the telltale signs of pitting on the metal skin of the plane emanating from the interior.
Bear in mind that aviation is an extremely safe and reliable form of transportation and although it is not without risk, you are much more likely to be injured or killed in a car accident or even on a commuter train. Don’t drink and drive. Do not use recreational drugs and drive and ensure your prescription medication will not impair your ability to drive safely. TSA provides up to date travel safety and security information. US and foreign government websites also provide information about conditions on the ground in a number of foreign countries. The US Department of State (www.state.gov) and the British Foreign Office (http://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice) have comprehensive travel advisory websites which are updated frequently.
Like this article? Send us your thoughts to info@securitystrategiestoday.com and follow us on Twitter @securitystrateg
]]>In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, as we know, we experienced a radical change in the way we live our daily lives in the US and many parts of the world. When airports finally reopened for commercial flights, the security delays were quite long, random checks were instituted and quickly became a routine aspect of security protocols. Armed, uniformed US military patrolled the interior and K-9 units at times were visible. We became accustomed to the requirement to produce a government-issued ID at check-in and at times at boarding. Airport workers were required to obtain new employment IDs and background checks of new hires are now required. Intrusion-proof cabin doors on aircraft were installed or existing doors were retrofitted. Flight crews were trained on how to physically restrain passengers and armed pilots and air marshals were scheduled on many routes. Other protocols, both in flight and at airports, have been instituted, many of which are and should remain hidden from the public at large.
An attack like those on 9/11 has not been repeated and as expected, the threat has evolved. This evolution is a direct result of the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq and the hardening of the air transportation sector. More than any other factor, we consider both armed conflicts to be the principle cause of this evolving threat.
The NATO led war in Afghanistan partitioned the country into zones of tribal and government influence, strengthened and weakened internal alliances and eventually ended in the establishment of a much more stable, marginally secular, central government with control over its territory. Although NATO countries suffered significant losses in Afghanistan, its main objective of destroying Al Qaeda, including its safe havens and infrastructure, was largely accomplished. The government of Pakistan, long accused of turning a blind eye to the organization’s presence, was caught with its pants down when the US tracked Osama Bin Laden to a remote village and executed him. Since that time, the Islamabad government has increased its vigilance to the degree that it can, spurred into action occasionally by devastating attacks on its troops and police officers.
Although Al Qaeda remains a threat, it is deemed no longer capable of planning and executing a September 11 style attack. It has gone from a vertical hierarchy with integrated command and control to a decentralized, horizontal organization. The group does maintain its influence throughout the region, whether in isolated groups of Al Qaeda adherents or through new franchise formations, such as Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Isis. These groups might have coordinated some operations with Al Qaeda central, but with the passage of time and destruction of the AQ core, their autonomy has increased. Intelligence suggests that they seek and receive little guidance from what was once the world’s most feared terrorist group. Still, these dynamic groups are inspired by the Al Qaeda ideology to a degree, although AQ never had the puritanical religious fervor of Isis.
Although core Al Qaeda is all but destroyed, and Afghanistan is on the road to full sovereignty, the war in Iraq was an unmitigated disaster and its repercussions will be felt for decades. We will not re-litigate the conflict here, but we will discuss how both the wars-Iraq and Afghanistan-have contributed to shaping the global terrorist threat.
Like swatting a beehive, the war in Iraq took an already agitated population and caused it to disperse to far-flung regions and lands. A great Iraqi diaspora was founded, one which surpassed in numbers and in sheer desperation the expat population that grew over the decades of Saddam Hussein’s rule. This time however, their homeland was invaded by foreign powers operating under false pretense. Although at the beginning of the conflict invading forces were greeted as liberators, this attitude quickly changed as the Iraqi population witnessed war crimes, torture, CIA-sponsored sexual assault and humiliation of prisoners and up to 200,000 of its own citizens killed. The fighting was fierce and the fallout significant in a war that lasted nearly seven years.
The complexity of today’s terrorist threat stands in juxtaposition to the easily understood and predictable consequences of the two wars. On one hand, Afghanistan is reasonably stable and its government enjoys widespread international support. As alluded to earlier in this article, the Al Qaeda safe havens are gone and remnants of the organization are largely isolated or otherwise marginalized. Although challenges remain, Kabul has assumed the informal role of regional peacekeeper, at least when it can wrest some time away from the non-stop attention it must pay to an impoverished population. Great strides however have been made in education, health care, women’s rights and the rights of minorities.
But Iraq, sadly, is a devastated war zone with an authoritarian-like government resentful of the United States and wary of its intentions. Any wonder? Its population bears the scars of war and its pockmarked cities and towns will take a decade or more to rebuild. Iraqis have little incentive to cooperate in Western terrorist eradication campaigns as they feel shortchanged, lied to and stripped of their identity after decades of Saddam Hussein, followed by a brutal war that wiped out entire families and villages. The government’s counterterrorism efforts are often conceived and implemented on a reactive basis and at times are counterproductive to Western efforts.
That is the backdrop. Yes, the threat has evolved significantly since 09/11 but remains critical. The players have also changed. With Al Qaeda on the run and the entire region destabilized, radicalized individuals-some of whom adhere to proxy groups and some who act independently-have emerged to fill the void. It is an asymmetric threat if there ever was one and therefore requires unconventional means to address it.
Like this article? Send your thoughts to info@securitystrategiestoday.com
Security Strategies Today provides on site threat and vulnerability assessments, as well as training in crisis management and business continuity.
]]>Walk in to any airport in the US, Europe or the Middle East and you will find a welcoming check-in area, complete with newsstands, eateries and dozens of check-in banks and lines. Airport personnel and passengers mingle, by design, in the area and access is gained through public transportation, taxi, bus, personally owned vehicle, etc. Terrorists correctly have identified this area as vulnerable to infiltration and subsequent attack. The same goes for the baggage claim area, usually on the lower level of a terminal and quite possibly even more vulnerable to attack, given that it is less crowded and appears to receive less attention by law enforcement. After all, those people are leaving the confines of the airport. That however does not make the area safer, as the Istanbul attack made painfully clear.
In the 1970s and 1980s, airport check-in area attacks, especially in the Middle East and in Europe, were frequent. In December, 1985 the airports in Rome, Italy (Fiumicino) and in Vienna, Austria (Schwechat) were attacked by gunmen who threw explosives and sprayed passengers and airline personnel with bullets. The targets were the check-in counters for US carrier TWA and Israeli carrier El Al. A total of 19 were killed. In the aftermath of that attack, Italian authorities relocated US and Israeli carriers to their own check-in area, where passengers were screened for tickets and an ID before entering. That helps somewhat, but a determined terrorist on a suicide mission would not hesitate to purchase a ticket for same day travel and then detonate an explosives-laden vest once inside the check-in area.
In the years after the Rome attack, uniformed police officers and military personnel became commonplace in non-US airports. That certainly adds a deterrent. Not until after the attacks of September 11, 2001 did such personnel become visible in US airports. Better late than never, but their presence inside the terminal may be more of a security blanket for nervous passengers rather than a strong deterrent. Of course, no deterrent is foolproof. So the question is, what else are airport operating authorities to do to harden security in these public access areas?
We’ve listed below some of the practices either currently in place or under consideration by airport authorities worldwide. Not all will be effective in each and every airport, as local laws, customs and the effectiveness of personnel training will influence the outcome. Furthermore, the structure of airport terminals, including drive-up access as well as subway or other train service to the building must be considered. Among the most common under consideration are the following:
-Adopting a double layer of airport security screening, which would include placing X-ray machines and scanners at the entrance to the terminal. In effect, access to the terminal is granted only after successfully meeting the screening requirements curbside. We note that airports in Turkey have this entrance area screening. It was not however in place at the baggage claim area entrances.
-Increasing the number of explosives-detecting K-9s, both inside the terminal and along adjacent sidewalks. The dogs are extremely accurate in their detection capabilities, but it is an expensive proposition and it takes an average of a year to train the dog and its human handler before deployment.
-Increasing the number and the visibility of armed, uniformed military and police personnel in and about the terminal, especially along terminal access roads and sidewalks. Random roadblocks and law enforcement searches of vehicles attempting to access the airport terminals are on the increase.
-Finally, both in Europe and in the US, increased intelligence gathering and sharing is indispensable. Airport security squads have been stood up both in the FBI and in some local law enforcement departments specifically to gather, analyze and share intelligence. Airline and airport operating authorities must assume an active role in these groups, as their local and daily incident reports, from a suspicious package to reporting of an unruly passenger or a passenger who is turned away, need to be reviewed and analyzed for proper context. Any and all incidents deemed to be attempts to thwart or evade security must be reported and shared.
Of course, there are many more noteworthy security enhancements being implemented worldwide, many of which are not made public for obvious reasons. Predictably, as airlines and governments have hardened the overall commercial aviation environment, especially with regard to aircraft access, terrorists have sought to identify softer targets. Successful attacks on these targets have devastating effects, both physical and psychological. We must stay one step ahead of the terrorist, but finding reliable measures that are not turned on their head with each new attack is the challenge.
]]>The Transporation Security Administration (TSA) is once again under fire. This time, it is not for potentially dangerous security lapses or employee misconduct. It is taking the blame for tortuous airport security lines, some of which extend out to sidewalks in front of terminals, causing many passengers to miss their flights. The wait times for accessing the sterile zones (gate areas) of terminals has exceeded three hours, both at Chicago’s two airports and at others nationwide. The long, frustrating wait has caused nerves to fray and airlines to demand improvements in TSA operations.
But TSA is not the only one bearing repsonsibility for the debacle. Certainly, the trimming of agency staff from 45,000 to 42,000 has contributed to the problem, as is the low pay and the fact that screeners are often confronted by frustrated and downright rude passengers. “TSA has (also) made bad assumptions about the level of personnel resources necessary to process 2 million people that come through a day”, said Tom Blank to CNBC recently. Mr. Blank served as the agency’s number two official and is considered one of the “founding fathers” of the TSA.
That is on TSA and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, to fix. But other key players either refuse to recognize their role in creating the intolerable wait or downplay its importance.
Perhaps the single biggest factor contributing to long wait times is the airline policy, adopted gradually over the past decade, of charging for checked luggage. Non-premium passengers pay anywhere from $20 to $30 for a checked article and the rate often increases if a passenger seeks to check two. The trend may have started in the US, but European airlines and others have followed suit. Ever wonder why those overhead bins fill up before most passengers have boarded the aircraft? Thank the airlines and their fees. Passengers cram ever more of their belongings into overstuffed carry-ons and push the limit on both the size and number of articles they can take into the cabin.
Local airport authorities need to do their part as well. They can demand that airlines operate in and out of their facilities according to a staggered schedule, rather than cram more flights into popular timeframes, such as early morning or late afternoon during week days. This would reduce passenger volume. They can be the first line of screening as well, directing passengers to check a bag at the airline’s desk if an attempt is made to head into the security line with too many articles or with oversized gear. Passengers too must realize that by limiting what they pack and bring as luggage to the airport they will be speeded along.
But the buck stops with TSA. The agency is already adopting more intelligence-focused passenger screening and increasing the number of new hires. Both measures take training and quite some time to put into place. The increasing use of explosives-detecting K-9s is a big step in the right direction. The dogs can detect up to 20,000 chemical compounds and mixtures that can be volatile on board a plane. But the animals also require up to a year of training, together with a handler and come at a hefty price.
Finally, Congress can allocate sufficient operating funds to the agency and authorize additional money to increase staffing levels if it wants to do its part in quelling public outrage. The agency can also be mandated by DHS to not divert airport-trained personnel to other high profile events, such as national political party conventions or the Superbowl. Although those events do in fact require participation of myriad federal agencies, a core group of TSA personnel free of airport responsibilities can be trained and used specifically for that purpose. A reduction in the TSA PreCheck fee, currently $85, would encourage more passengers to sign up for this expedited, risk-based, pre-flight screening protocol.
What is risk-based screening as opposed to general screening? That discussion will be covered in an upcoming e-newsletter but at its core, the former functions by focusing screening efforts on those deemed to represent more of a potential threat, based on prior history, travels, associations and other factors.
So there is a long stretch to go but it seems the agency has got the word that reform is required. It has a tough but vital job to do and it deserves our respect and cooperation.