The details of the horrific Mandalay Bay attack offer a clear example to the hospitality industry as to just why proactive – and often covert – security standards must be tested and implemented.  The name of the game is to detect, deter or neutralize an attack before it takes place. In order to do this, smart technology and keen intelligence gathering techniques must be deployed. Well-versed analytical personnel must have unfettered access to the intelligence and offer management their professional assessment as to the threat at hand.

We note here some of the suggestions we have provided in recent conversations with hotel security personnel or in hospitality sector security associations or meetings.  If implemented, these revised or updated protocols could further enhance security for guests and employees. But to be effective, they each must be studied by the hotel operator, assessed for potential legal challenges and training must be provided to employees.

Again, with the emphasis on being proactive and getting out in front of potential threats, consider the following measures:

• Ensure your hotel security personnel participate in any local or regional periodic security meetings with their peers from other hotel chains.  That is a great way to share intelligence on criminal or extremist trends affecting the tourism sector and hotels in particular. Even though a particular crime trend may not have reached your geographic area or if it is affecting only brands that do not reflect your  demographic, you still need to be aware of it and prepare for it. And don’t keep the intel to yourself-your staff needs to be aware and that includes employees at the worker-bee level.

• Ensure to provide meaningful and recurrent training to staff with frequent guest interface regarding possible indicators of suspicious activity.  Probably the most important line of defense here is the housekeeping staff, which enters guest rooms on a daily basis, often more than once. Staff should be trained to recognize the signs of potentially unsafe or illegal activity, such as telltale signs of human trafficking or prostitution.  The accumulation of several unmarked boxes, bags or suitcases inconsistent with the number of guests assigned to the room is something noteworthy as well. Any unusual or foul odor or the presence of an unknown substance in any area of the room should trigger a notification to security personnel.  Again, we are reminded of the saying “see something, say something”.

• Room entry when the “do not disturb” sign hangs on the outside of the guest room should not be interpreted as a mandate not to enter.  Each hotel operator will have to establish its own policy with regard to periodic staff entry and as to how long is too long before a knock or a call from the front desk is made.  Entry policy should be closely coordinated with the hotel’s legal counsel.*

*Key Point:  Consider adding a waiver or consent clause to your guest registration paperwork in which the room occupant specifically agrees to periodic entry by hotel staff to ensure the safety of all guests and employees.

• A clear “know your customer” policy should be established.  In other words, hotel security staff or employees at the operator’s corporate headquarters need to implement a cursory background check of certain arriving guests who may seem out of place in the establishment.  For example, if you are welcoming a 20 year old man or woman into your hotel and if the room is in the $400-$500 per night category, you may want to do a “Google” check or similar check on the name. The person has done nothing wrong so far and possibly never will, but in general, a 20 year old does not fit the demographic of a hotel charging that amount of money per night.  You may find nothing, but you may find that the person has had a series of run-ins with the law. That of course does not necessarily mean he or she should be excluded from the premises, but it’s a nice heads up to the staff.
  

• The use of check-in/check-out apps has to be the most frustrating technology out there for hotel security personnel.  It allows the guest to have virtually no interface with the hotel staff in that check in and out is performed electronically and billing is automatically charged to the credit card on file.  Room entry is achieved with a downloaded code or barcode, which the guest holds in proximity to a reader made a part of the exterior door lock. If you use this technology at your hotel, ensure that you DO have interface with the guest during his or her stay by knocking on the door occasionally or by placing calls to the room.

There are many other proactive ways to enhance security at hotels and large venues.  Various technologies are commercially available which permit iris scanning or facial recognition.  Of course, with the adoption of new techniques, some privacy is given up. Individual brands and properties will determine the right mix for their locations, based on customer demographics, prior incidents, crime and terrorism trends and importantly, the law.  Privacy cannot and should not be total in a hotel as guest and employee security and safety must be taken into consideration.

The insider threat can be described as those hazards and risks-including physical, cyber, monetary and reputational, that are derived or stem from employees-even former employees-as well as contractors who have access to your products, patents, technology, strategic plans-including marketing plans and employee information.

Probably the most famous insider threat case is that of Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor with broad access to some of the nation’s most sensitive secrets. Snowden, who has been indicted by the US Department of Justice on espionage and other charges, has sought asylum in Russia and has been living there for the past three years. His alleged insider activity includes theft of government secrets by downloading hundreds of thousands of classified NSA and CIA documents and subsequently disseminating them to the public through a journalist, Glenn Greewald, formerly of The Guardian. In committing the alleged activity, Snowden hurt national security by compromising sources, techniques and intelligence collection priorities and goals which are the exclusive property of the US government.

But what are some other types of insider threat activity? Consider the following possibilities:

• A software designer with a “non compete” rider in his contract takes off with nothing more than his skills and knowledge of your latest app design and provides it to a competitor in exchange for a new job. Threat? Crime? It may be both;
• A truck driver working for a shipper that transports your merchandise suddenly absconds with the day’s deliveries, composed mainly of televisions, computer hardware and other electronics. He’s not your employee, but he has access to your warehouse and merchandise. How do you forsee something like this and what measures can you take to prevent it from recurring?
• Your new system for converting steam into clean energy for powering automobiles has been patented and is proprietary. Why is a similar version showing up in a competitor’s new models? Has your intellectual property been stolen or compromised somehow? How was the compromise carried out? Was it deliberate or inadvertent? Who gave up the protected information?
• A law enforcement officer has developed a drug habit and he is eventually arrested for stealing evidence, including money and drugs. Many of your department’s cases are now compromised and defense attorneys are asking the courts to overturn convictions of their clients where it can be shown that evidence was collected or accessed by the suspect officer. Is this an insider threat? The reputational damage to the department is potentially huge.

The above scenarios are hypothetical but similar situations involving insiders have occurred in the past. The insider threat is one of the most dangerous but still it remains shadowy and hard to detect. What are some indicators that might suggest a person is or risks becoming a threat to your operations? What preventive measures can you take to protect your business? How much intrusion into or monitoring of an employee’s behavior on the job is legal?

We’ll address some of these questions in upcoming issues. In the meantime, follow us on Twitter for more advice on the insider threat and for all things security related.

The TGV or Train a Grande Vitesse, the ultra-high speed star of France’s national railroad system, SCNF, had pulled into berth 17 at the Marseille-Saint Charles station, simmering down after its nearly four hour trek from Paris.  Out of an economy class car steps Mahibah, a 24-year old hair stylist who makes her living in a small salon in the gritty Paris neighborhood of Mantes-La-Jolie.  Pulling her overnight carry-on size suitcase with one hand and holding a small box of rich almond-filledhalawiaat in the other, Mahibah is met by her aunt, Hadil, and Hadil’s daughter, 20-year old Hela.

The three exchange pleasantries and hop into a waiting taxi for the short ride to her relatives’ small apartment, located in a multi-story, dilapidated apartment building along the city’s port, one of the busiest in Europe.  There, she hugs her much-loved and respected cousin, Karim, the 22 year-old fledgling architecture student who makes ends meet by cleaning fish and hauling ice at a nearby fishmonger, or poissonnerie.

Karim is down on his luck.  He can no longer afford the tuition to continue his studies at the local university and he could never make ends meet on his own.  His Arabic-accented French will get him nowhere in the search for a better job in Marseille.  Between generalized suspicion of Muslims among the native French population and the already sky-high unemployment rate, France has become inhospitable for him.  So he has accepted an on-line offer to assist for a 90-day period in a Saudi government sponsored relief agency on the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria’s second city.  He will be leaving in a few days and will be accompanied by Yesmine, his girlfriend for more than a year now.

What Karim knows but does not tell his relatives is that the relief agency is ideologically linked to the Syrian opposition and its workers are expected to undergo a period of arms and combat-style training, “just in case” its headquarters or personnel are ambushed by the Syrian government’s armed forces.  Yesmine is aware of it, as she was the one who alerted Karim to the opportunity and spoke about the group with a volunteer friend who returned recently.  They spoke about the rewards and risks: Is it ISIS?  No, the friend did not think so.  What about an Al-Qaeda link?  Not sure, but he did work with young men who spoke Arabic with a Gulf accent and others who spoke only Somali and a few basic phrases in English.  What about the extent of relief work?  Not too well organized and spotty, he admitted, but still rewarding.

Convinced that the good they could do for suffering Syrians outweighed the risk of being caught up in conflict, Karim and Yesmine head out.  They use their French passports to facilitate their passage through security at the airport, en route to Tunis, where they can connect to one of the few remaining commercial flights to Damascus.

It is not long before they arrive at the organization’s camp, an abandoned middle school on the outskirts of the city, with blown out windows and intermittent electrical service.  They are each provided with clean bed linens and a copy of an English-language Quran, complete with a printed version of sermons given by Anjem Choudary, the Islamist preacher arrested last month by UK authorities.

And so begins the journey of two young Western Muslims on what could end up being a one-way trip to radicalization.  With little money, no real prospects for decent employment and living on the margins of society, Karim and Yesmine are taking a chance that they can do some good, maybe gain some valuable skills, and at the same time avoid being drawn into the circle and under the influence of radical Islamist ideologues who have taken control of so many schools, relief organizations and the like in the Middle East.

The story of Karim and Yesmine is fictional, but it is representative of the disturbing sequence of events that is happening with increasing frequency in Western nations.  Young men and women, most of whom are practicing Muslims, are becoming enthralled in the notion of waging war against their government, their homeland, Christians and Jews in general and even against other Muslims.

US and other Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies are working collaboratively in an effort to identify youth who have been radicalized, either at home or abroad, to include their whereabouts, details of their training, their contacts, sources of funding and intentions.

Recently, French President Francois Hollande warned the French public of “young men who are indoctrinated, brainwashed, and who can come back home with the worst plans in mind.”  A prominent Italian counterterrorism official noted as well that female jihadists, while not as common as their male counterparts, are growing in number.  Quite often, the women are native born Europeans who have converted to Islam after falling in love with transplanted North African immigrants, some of whom, like Karim, have lived in the shadows or have come under the wing of a radicalized preacher.

The notion of women joining the ranks of radical Islamist organizations is not new, although the vast majority of radicalized young adults are believed to be men between the ages of 18-30.  The case of the three Somali-American girls from the Denver area who were returned to the US by German authorities in recent days is evidence of the trend to recruit females to the ranks. The girls, aged 15, 16 and 17, had stolen $2,000 of their parents’ money along with their passports and were thought to be on their way to Turkey, before heading across the border to eventually meet with ISIS in Syria.  The FBI is attempting to determine just how evolved their plan was, if they were in touch with ISIS recruiters and if they pose a current threat to the homeland.

It is estimated that men and women from more than 50 countries are training with ISIS or with like-minded groups in Syria.  Those with Western passports pose the most immediate problem for Europe, the US and Canada, as visa-free travel for holders of these passports facilitates entry and exit.  In the EU, the problem is compounded due to the borderless travel within the block of nations.  Gain entry into Spain or Italy, for example, and a person gains entry into most all other EU nations, with the noticeable exception of the UK.  Even with its national borders intact however, the UK is likely the European nation most at risk from home-grown (or transplanted) radicalized youth.  The upsurge in cases is astonishing.  The trend toward the lone-wolf actor, as opposed to extremists acting as part of a conspiracy, makes detection and intervention by authorities less likely.

Eric was a bright young boy growing up in North London in the early nineties.  He loved school, especially math, and he of course was mad about football.  His bedroom was plastered with posters of his favorite Arsenal players, as well as with flags and other memorabilia with the official logo and colors of Premier League teams.  He had even been accepted into Eton College, the top caliber Windsor prep academy for boys and a key feeder school for some the UK’s most prestigious universities.  He was fluent in French and Spanish and was looking forward to enrolling in the Royal Navy.  Technically skilled, Eric was fascinated with positive and negative buoyancy theory and the complex calculations required to dive or surface the advanced submarines that are crucial to Britain’s sea prowess.

But a strange sequence of events began to unfold in the summer of 2004.  Eric’s father, Jonathan, left the family for another woman, withdrawing as well from his parental responsibilities.  His mother, Nada, made preparations to return to her native Morocco.  Out of money and with no means of support but for a meager subsidy from the Department of Work and Pensions, Nada bought a one-way ticket to Tangier for herself and Eric.

But Eric refused to go along.  He was born and brought up in England. This was home.  Having recently turned 18, he chose to stay with is uncle in London until he could save enough money to get a flat of his own.  He began working at his uncle’s restaurant, cutting and trimming goat and mutton and ensuring its slaughter and preparation were in accordance with the rules of halal, the dietary guidelines followed by observant Muslims.  He went to Friday prayers at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London and struck up friendships with other similarly situated young men.  He began to take part in proselytizing activities and broke off the relationship he had begun months earlier with his 20 year-old girl friend, Emma, citing as a reason her refusal to convert to Islam.

We last caught up with Eric after he arrived at Gatwick from Marrakesh last May.  He had been deported from the country by Moroccan authorities after his name appeared on a watch list provided by a European security service.  It seems Eric had been detained for questioning by security personnel in Yemen, after he was seen leaving the Al-Da’wah Centermadrassa.  The center is a known hotbed of Salafi extremism and was frequented by convicted terrorist Carlos Bledsoe, the Tennessee born radicalized Islamist who killed an army soldier and wounded another outside a Little Rock recruiting station in June of 2009.  Wanting nothing to do with someone they suspected of having ties to extremists, the secular government in Rabat promptly escorted him to the airport and supplied him with a ticket back to the UK.

Eric, who now calls himself Fawzan, vows to return to Yemen, stating that his experience there taught him just how corrupt Western governments and societies are.  He is devout in his practice of Islam but respects those who do not adhere to his faith.  He has however little tolerance for the moderate Sunni regimes in the Middle East and voices a deep-seated hatred of the Saudi House of Saad, the ruling family in Riyadh.  According to Fawzan, the regime is a stooge for the West, in particular of the United States.  It makes a mockery of Islam by claiming to uphold its values, while at the same time its throngs of wealthy royal family members travel to London and Disneyworld, where they carouse, drink alcohol and engage in out of wedlock relationships.  The quest for wealth and opulence, fed by seemingly endless oil revenue, must be eliminated from these societies, according to Fawzan, in order to avoid their ultimate destruction by non-believers.

Fawzan is not a violent person.  Twisting his prayer beads, he speaks in soft tones but is steadfast in his convictions.  He plans on sharing an apartment for a while in Chelsea with an Emirati student he met while working at his uncle’s restaurant.  The friend, Assaf, plans to travel to Somalia next year to see firsthand the atrocities the regime in Mogadishu has committed against its own people.  If he can save enough for the airfare, Fawzan can make the trip with him and a wealthy Kuwaiti who attends the Brixton Mosque in South London has offered to pick up his food and lodging expenses.  He is excited about this possibility and looks forward to relaying his experiences to us in a future meeting.

The above account is fictional but it is based on a compilation of stories from individuals who have experienced a similar trajectory.  It is a somewhat typical scenario of how Western youth, mainly males age 17-30, enter at first unknowingly into a radicalization process that often culminates in acts in support of terrorism, including attacks against the state.  Of course, there are many avenues to radicalization and not all such individuals will commit crimes or train with terrorist groups.  But it is worth noting that in general terms, the radicalization process takes place over time and is often not detected by authorities until it is too late.

Can Fawzan be saved?  Can he be convinced that he is being led by radicals who have no interest in him as a person or in his future?  The answer will vary from case to case.  What is certain is that Western governments have a monumental challenge on their hands.  No amount of intelligence collection and analysis or law enforcement activity can detect and disrupt each and every process once its takes hold and it certainly cannot begin to quantify the threat accurately.  The wide variation offered by intelligence agencies in the estimated number of Western youth training with ISIS in the Middle East is evidence of this intelligence gap.An in-depth understanding of the radicalization process, including deciphering who is at risk and why, may be the best first steps in beginning to deal with the phenomenon.  Only time will tell.

While what happened to the flight and its 230 passengers and crew remains a mystery, what is clear is that additional security procedures would likely give us a better indication of the events leading up to the flight’s disappearance.  Specifically, there have been calls for “streaming” data live from the flight deck to the airline’s ground base or for closed circuit cameras to be installed throughout the cabin.  In addition, a US senator has even called forallpilots to be armed, a concept that would likely engender significant opposition within the United States, not to mention from foreign carriers operating to and from the US.

The use of deadly force on board an aircraft would be acceptable in only the most urgent situations and both the FAA and US Marshals Service have protocols in place for armed pilots and air marshals.  Arming all pilots, at least in the US, would remove the element of surprise that exists among the travelling public with regard to which pilots are carrying weapons and which flights have armed marshals on board.  That covert presence and element of unpredictability enhance flight safety.

What is a feasible possibility and a relatively inexpensive one at that would be for airlines to install CCTVs both in the flight deck and at key locations throughout the cabin.  On a recent flight from Phoenix to London on British Airways, we noticed that the 747-400 was equipped on the upper deck with a CCTV trained on the door to the cockpit.  Emirates Airline also has interior CCTVs on most, if not all of its aircraft.  While the cameras do not stream live images to a ground base, they do provide valuable intelligence to investigators should an in-flight event take place that requires follow-up.  The event could be a simple disturbance by an unruly passenger that is quickly and safely handled or it could be a significant security threat or aircraft malfunction.  Either way, with strategically placed cameras, some of the event sequence or even all of it would be memorialized.

In the case of cockpit cameras, the technique would provide yet another check on the performance of the pilots, whether it be routine or emergency in nature, as well as provide evidence of unauthorized personnel or passengers on the flight deck.  The recordings can be used as a remedial training aid to the cabin crew and also provide valuable insight to investigators when deciphering the chain of events leading up to an accident or catastrophic loss.  Of course, in flight cameras would need to be encased and hardened to withstand impact and extreme temperatures, just like the flight data and voice recorders.

Some privacy advocates have cried foul, but an aircraft flying through the skies at 500 miles per hour is no less of a conveyance than an automobile or motorcycle on a city street.  It can be used as weapon of mass destruction, as the world saw on September 11, 2001.  In fact, the improper operation of the craft or its deliberate ditching would result in greater loss of life and property damage than a derailed subway car or a multi vehicle freeway accident.  We are required to submit to a somewhat intrusive search before boarding an aircraft as a condition of carriage.  We may also be subject to search before entering certain buildings, government or private.  A police officer is authorized and in fact is required to stop a vehicle if he witnesses a traffic infraction as a means of protecting the greater public.

So, while the installation of CCTVs or other recording devices in the passenger cabin and even in the cockpit may strike some as an unwarranted invasion of privacy, passengers would do well to remember that it is not government eavesdropping, but rather consensual monitoring conducted by the airline of its crew and its passengers.  For that brief period of time when you are on an aircraft, you have entrusted your safety and indeed your life to trained professionals.  It’s similar to entering the subway system-you are monitored at the token booth and on the platform.  You may also be monitored while within an individual subway car.  The well-being and safety of fellow passengers and crew require us all to accept a little less privacy.  Those opposed to this concept may file suit, but in US courts at least, recent case law has been supportive of greater monitoring in the public arena.

We hope that the cause of the tragic loss of MH370 and its passengers and crew is determined with a reasonable degree of certainty.  Until then, we must rely on the expert investigators and military personnel who have embarked on the dangerous mission of finding the aircraft.  If however a criminal event took place that led to the demise of the flight, we can and should expect additional and more intrusive security measures, both on the ground and in flight, to be adopted.

In addition to the physical surroundings, it is equally important for hospitality industry management and security professionals to ensure that they keep abreast of the latest intelligence in criminal and terrorism trends affecting their area of operations. These trends of course vary greatly depending on country and region. The overall criminal threat environment in general worsens as economic and political stability decline in a country. Similarly, the effectiveness of local law enforcement, including their training, readiness and wherewithal to address criminal trends in the domain is impacted by economic factors as well as the legal regime in place. What is viewed as a serious crime in some countries may go undetected or unaddressed-or addressed only on an ad hoc basis-in others.

Nevertheless, security personnel worldwide are facing increasing challenges in their ability to detect and deter sex trafficking and prostitution in hospitality venues. The problem is serious and not only affects the overall environment at a hotel or time-share community, but causes life-long physical and psychological trauma on the victims. Hospitality industry personnel are uniquely situated to provide credible “eyes and ears” to law enforcement in the effort to reduce sex tourism and prostitution and can become valuable partners in providing a safer environment for all.

Some tips for hotel operators and employees in detecting this type of criminal activity can include the following:

• Signs of disorientation among young female guests or the inability to articulate even basic sentences in English may indicate that the girl or woman is being held under duress or has been kidnapped for sex trafficking purposes. Signs or fear and anxiety may be present among the women;
• Heavy traffic in and out of the room should be cause for concern unless you are able to definitively determine that it is unrelated to criminal activity. For example, some companies may rent a hotel room to interview job applicants. In this case however, there should be no secrecy and the other factors listed above should not be present;
• Arriving visitors, often unaccompanied males, cannot name the registered guest in the room they intend to visit;
• The “Do Not Disturb” sign is nearly always on the exterior doorknob of the room and the guests refuse housekeeping services.

Of course, there may be logical and quite innocent explanations for many or all of the above factors on a given day in a particular hotel. Still, it is worth remembering that in general terms, those trafficking in humans for purposes of sex tourism or prostitution make frequent use of hotels as they afford a degree of isolation, anonymity and privacy.

If you suspect sex trafficking at your hotel, contact your local police department or the FBI. Most large departments have units or squads dedicated to detecting this type of criminal activity and are quite effective in establishing sophisticated operations to catch the offenders and to provide appropriate referral services to the victims. Your local department is a great resource for current intelligence and may be able to provide some training to your staff in the most recent trends in the phenomenon.

The answers to those questions and the legal basis justifying them reside in the details encapsulated in the US-Italy Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance, one of the oldest in force today.  It remains to be seen whether the Italian Ministry of Justice will request her extradition and whether the US Department of Justice will appear before a US federal district court to act on a provisional request for arrest.  So far, the government of Italy has not requested extradition.

If all this legal talk sounds confusing, the purpose of the above is to illustrate a few details of what a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or MLAT means in the realm of criminal justice cooperation between nations.  There are dozens of MLAT treaties currently in force between the US and several nations.  Each MLAT treaty must go through a ratification process in both countries that are signatories.  In the US, MLAT treaties, like all treaties, require approval by the US Senate.  Once ratified, it has the force of law, meaning that it is not at all easy for the US or the other signing party to wiggle out of its obligations.

In general terms, MLAT treaties do the following:

• They set forth the terms of police to police cooperation between each nation;

• They establish which investigative techniques require more substantive process (such as a letters rogatory, similar to a subpoena) before one country hands over evidence to another;

• With regard to evidence, they establish the terms under which foreign-derived evidence eventually is used in the court proceedings of the other sovereign nation which has signed the treaty;

• Significantly, most MLAT treaties deal mainly with criminal matters, rather than civil procedure.  However, revisions to treaties increasingly address civil matters as long as one party to the civil action is the sovereign nation that has signed the treaty.

Importantly, it is vital to understand that in cases where civil litigation requires evidence from overseas, the private individual must rely on his or her attorneys in country to file an action requesting the production of such evidence.  Think of resolving claims over residential property after the death of the property owner, in other words, an inheritance matter.  The MLAT treaties regulate activities between states, not between individuals.  So, you’re on your own in the case of property rights, divorce settlements, or civil liability/damages/restitution.

Finally, MLATs are written with the understanding that before evidence can be transferred from one country to another or before a person can be arrested in one country at the request of another, the alleged crime in the requesting country must also be a crime in the country where the defendant is located.  For example, drug trafficking, murder or sexual assault is a crime in the US as well as in most others, so that hurdle is overcome.  Criminal association (not conspiracy) is not a violation in the US, but is in some other counties, so the treaty would not grant the arrest of a person in the US charged with that offense.

Notably, most countries have stipulated in their MLAT agreements with the US that if the death penalty is a possibility upon a finding of guilt in a US court process, the US government (and state or local jurisdictions in the US) will not seek the death penalty.  Without this provision, there would be no MLAT agreements with any European Union country, all of which have outlawed the death penalty.

With regard to judicial cooperation within the EU, the old bilateral MLAT agreements have been supplanted by the multi-faceted agreements ratified by the European Parliament and implemented by the European Commission.  These agreements spell out EU-wide terms of criminal justice cooperation between member states, including use of the European arrest warrant, which permits one EU member to execute the arrest of a person wanted by another member state without seeking additional authorization from a justice ministry.