The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted in 1990 to prevent discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all aspects of life. The Act has been applied to a variety of segments of our society, including building entrance designs, website displays, and workplace accommodations. Recently, a new twist to the Act arose when a 12-year-old boy visited a Colonial Williamsburg restaurant with his classmates on a school field trip.

The case, J.D. v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and later appealed to the 4th Cir Ct. App. No 18-1725. In J.D., a 12-year-old boy with severe Celiac disease visited a restaurant with his classmates on a school field trip to Colonial Williamsburg. J.D.’s condition was so severe that even the slightest ingestion of gluten-based foods caused severe illness. On prior occasions, other restaurants had offered J.D. gluten-free meals that accidentally or unknowingly contained trace amounts of gluten, which caused J.D.’s symptoms to flare up. Because of this, J.D.’s parents decided that when J.D. had to eat out, they would prepare J.D.’s food for him, so that he could safely and comfortably eat without incident or fear of incident. Knowing that the field trip would require J.D. to eat at a restaurant, J.D.’s father (who also attended the field trip) brought a home-prepared meal for J.D. to eat while the rest of the class ordered its meals from the restaurant menu.

When the time came for lunch, the restaurant staff notified J.D. and his father that he was not allowed to consume outside prepared foods in the restaurant due to Virginia’s Health Code. In fact, Virginia’s Health Code prohibits food prepared in a private home from being used or offered for human consumption in a food establishment unless the home kitchen is inspected and regulated by the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. 12 Va. Admin Code § 5-421-270(B). However, as an accommodation, the restaurant advised J.D. that its chef would prepare J.D. a gluten-free meal of baked chicken and potatoes to meet his specific needs. The father declined the offer, stating that they did not want to risk kitchen mistakes, and he preferred J.D. eat his home-prepared meal. Left with the options of eating the chef-prepared meal, not eating, or eating outside the restaurant, J.D. and his father left the restaurant and ate the home-prepared meal separate from his classmates.

J.D. filed suit under §504 of Title III of the ADA, claiming that Colonial Williamsburg discriminated against him by excluding him from the restaurant and failing to modify its policy against the consumption of outside food. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and while the magistrate found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether J.D. was disabled under the ADA, he recommended dismissal because J.D. failed to establish that he was discriminated against because of his disability. The District Court Judge adopted the magistrate’s recommendations and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed to dismissal to the 4th Cir.

An ADA claim requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: 1) that plaintiff is disabled under the meaning of the Act; 2) that the defendant operates a place of public accommodation; and 3) the defendant discriminated against him because of that disability. See Ariz. ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010); Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008). In this case, there was no dispute on the second element, so the Court looked only at elements 1 and 3.

Under §12102(1)(A) of the ADA, a disability is defined as any “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” This is different from an impairment, which the Act defines as any physiological disorder or condition that affects one or more body systems, including digestive. 28 CFR §36.105(b)(1). The 4th Cir. noted that “‘[N]ot every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section,’ but it will meet the definition if ‘it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Id. § 36.105(d)(1)(v). Eating is a major life activity. Id. § 36.105(c)(1)(i).” J.D. at 10. The court then explained that when deciding if the Celiac disease created a disability, it had to interpret the ADA language “broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” Id. Even though J.D. had no symptoms when he avoided gluten, this was immaterial in determining if a disability existed, because the Court was required to look at his condition when he consumed gluten. Id. With the evidence showing that J.D. had serious consequences to his health when he ingested gluten and that he had an unusually small margin for error in his diet, the Court felt that there was a material question of fact as to whether J.D. had a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Thus, consistent with the District Court ruling, the court did not decide that J.D. had proven a disability, but rather, felt it was up to the jury to decide.

The Court then looked at the third element; i.e., whether or not Colonial Williamsburg discriminated against J.D. According to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), discrimination is defined, “in part, as: a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, [etc.].” Id. (emphasis in original)

The courts use a three-part test to determine if discrimination occurs. The three parts are: “(1) whether the requested modification is “necessary” for the disabled individual; (2) whether it is “reasonable”; and (3) whether it would “fundamentally alter the nature” of the public accommodation. Id., citing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001), at 683 n.38.

The Court first looked at whether the modification [allowing him to eat his home-prepared meal] was necessary to provide J.D. with a “like experience” to non-disabled guests. This necessarily requires the court to make an individualized inquiry into the plaintiff’s specific circumstances and determine if the proposed accommodation addresses the disability, or if the accommodation creates a condition that extends beyond the person’s capacity. In this case, J.D.’s evidence showed that he repeatedly became ill when exposed to gluten from meals prepared at restaurants, even when they were purported to be gluten-fee. While the court did not make an ultimate decision on whether the modification of its rules was necessary, it did find that there was sufficient evidence presented to create a genuine dispute of fact on whether eating out is beyond J.D.’s capacity.

Second, where an accommodation is already in place, a plaintiff may still be entitled to something more if he can show that the accommodation does not account sufficiently for his disability.” J.D. at 16. In this case, the restaurant’s proposed accommodation was to prepare a gluten-free meal. Given J.D.’s history of illness from prior attempts at gluten-free restaurant meals, it became a question of fact as to whether or not the restaurant’s proposed accommodation was sufficient. “Indeed, a jury might well reject J.D.’s evidence about the severity of his gluten intolerance, and thus find that the protocols at [the restaurant] were sufficient to account for his disability. But in our view, J.D. has put forth enough evidence at this stage to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the proposed accommodation sufficiently accounts for his disability.” Id. at 17.

For the next step of its analysis, the 4th Cir. considered whether or not the restaurant’s proposed accommodation was reasonable or not. Indeed, “[f]acilities are not required to make any and all possible accommodations that would provide full and equal access to disabled patrons,” but “need only make accommodations that are reasonable.” Id. at 18. Citations omitted. Here, the court pointed out that the restaurant allowed guests to serve their own food if it is for babies or if they wanted to bring a cake in for large celebrations, provided the restaurant was given advance notice. The fact that J.D. may not have provided advance notice to the restaurant was dismissed as irrelevant to the court, because the lack of notice did not require additional staffing or create an unreasonable hardship in the restaurant’s operations. And when looking at the Health Code regulations the restaurant cited for its policy, the 4th Cir. noted that the prohibition on home-prepared foods was designed to prevent restaurants from serving food prepared in private homes. It did not prohibit customers from bringing in outside food. There was no evidence introduced that J.D.’s request would truly impose a safety concern or risk contamination of other foods. The court reasoned that if that were the case, the restaurant would not allow outside foods in other circumstances.

The Court ultimately ruled that decisions of reasonableness of accommodations are highly individualized, fact-specific for each case. As a result, they are decisions best left to a jury, who can judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh the importance of evidence.

Finally, the Court looked to the restaurant’s affirmative defense that allowing homemade meals fundamentally changes the restaurant experience. Under this defense, the defendant must prove that the Plaintiff’s request would fundamentally alter the nature of the program or services provided by the restaurant. Like the other issues, the court considered, this too was found to be a jury question. A jury “could reasonably find that accommodating the occasional request of someone with severe food sensitivities would not fundamentally alter the Tavern’s business model, especially if other family members purchase food or (as happened here) if the meals are already paid for as part of a group rate.” Id. at 23.

Impact of Ruling

Given the above, the 4th Cir. reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded it back to the District Court. The takeaways from the decision are striking.

First, it seems clear that the court is framing ADA cases such as this to be treated similarly to ordinary negligence cases. Those cases are almost always fact-specific and to be determined by a jury. If there is any credible evidence to support a claimant’s case, the court is likely to defer ruling to the jury.

Second, it is important to note that the Health Code Regulation relied upon by the restaurant does not expressly state that it is designed to prohibit the serving of food, rather than customers bringing in food. This ruling places restaurants in a difficult position of having to choose between enforcing written regulations and agreeing to proposed individual modifications as necessitated by the ADA. Restaurant staffers are not trained in legal analysis, and it seems untenable that a waiter or manager would have to interpret the intent of a health regulation. Forcing a restaurant to make such interpretation exposes a restaurant to more litigation because the parties cannot know if it is proper to violate the regulations based on its language. Indeed, the Dissent correctly notes that the de facto result of this ruling is that “Restaurants must either allow patrons to consume food prepared outside their premises or must justify their refusal at a costly trial.” J.D. at 32. Both the disabled parties and the restaurant industry would be better served if the Health Regulation was written clearly to prohibit serving versus bringing in outside foods, and the restaurant could rely upon the code as written.

Finally, it seems clear that the Courts are taking an expansive view of the ADA’s coverage. Rather than draw bright line tests that disabled persons and businesses can plan for, individualized assessments on a case-by-case basis must be made. This is likely to result in inconsistent applications where some modifications are allowed but possibly similar modifications are not allowed. As the dissent in J.D. notes, “[t]he majority’s rule means that a patron’s demand that he be allowed to eat outside food will sometimes be reasonable and other times not. This puts managers in the middle of a difficult line-drawing exercise: What criteria are they supposed to use in navigating the tension between the ADA’s requirements and public health law? Which privately prepared meals must they allow and which may they refuse? The majority wouldn’t even require advance notice from customers in J.D.’s position, meaning that managers will have to evaluate the disruption and the safety hazard of a customer’s outside meal on the fly, with the specter of litigation hanging overhead.” J.D. at 31.

If you have any questions about this ruling, its impact on restaurant operations, or how it may impact your business, the attorneys at KPM LAW are ready for your call.

Among attorneys, there’s another equally well-known fact: Whenever a plaintiff slips and falls on ice—whether it is in a parking lot, a sidewalk, near a spigot or fountain or anywhere else—she will almost always argue that the defendant should have known of the condition because it was foreseeable that water would turn to ice and create a slip hazard. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has just ruled that knowing water freezes is not enough to establish foreseeability.

In the case of Thomas v. Omni Hotels, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21459 *; 2018 WL 3689248 (4th Cir. August 2, 2018), an Omni Hotel guest slipped and fell on a 22° Fahrenheit day after ice had formed on the floor near a semi-enclosed fountain. The Plaintiff argued that the ice must have formed from water blown out of the fountain by the wind. At the trial court level, the US District Court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, and held that the Plaintiff had failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Omni had actual or constructive notice of icy conditions or water escaping from the fountain. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. Despite the higher duty of care placed upon an innkeeper, Virginia law still required the Plaintiff to show actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition.

In this case, there was no evidence of prior reports of water escaping form the fountain or ice forming on the walkway. There was no evidence that any Omni employee actually knew about the ice that had formed

Despite the lack of those facts, Plaintiff argued that the cold temperature and existence of icicles on the fountain were sufficient to show constructive knowledge. The 4 th Circuit disagreed, holding that, “[t]hese facts certainly demonstrate the conditions upon which ice could form generally, but they are not sufficient to impose actual or constructive notice to Omni that ice would form on the walkway beside the fountain that morning when neither ice nor standing or escaping water had previously been observed in that location” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, knowing that water freezes at 32° does not mean that the defendant knew that ice had formed at the specific spot where plaintiff had fallen.

The Plaintiff then argued that, due to the time it takes for ice to form, a jury could infer that the ice existed for sufficient time, such that Omni should have known it was there. Again the Court disagreed, stating the “[a]ppearence of an item cannot be used to infer that it had been on the floor long enough” to create constructive notice.” Id. (citing Powers v Wal-Mart, Inc., 2006 US Dist. Lexis 74009 (W.D. Va. 2006). Thus, other than the fact that ice was present, there was no evidence as to when the ice formed. This was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge.

Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff could not establish when the ice had formed doomed any argument that Omni’s inspections had been insufficient. In order to argue that Omni’s inspections had been insufficient, the Plaintiff would need to show that the ice had been present and visible during those inspections. If the Plaintiff could not prove that the ice had been present at a given time, she could not claim that the inspector should have seen it when performing his inspection.

Finally, Plaintiff argued that the danger had been foreseeable because Omni created the dangerous condition by deciding to place the fountain near the cold elements. Under the “genesis doctrine,” a business is liable for injuries caused by foreseeable dangers it creates. The Court, however, rejected this argument. It held that there was no evidence showing what had caused the icy conditions near the fountain that morning. Moreover, there was no evidence that Omni created the icy buildup by placing the fountain in a partially covered area or by failing to turn off the water. Given this—along with the fact that there had never been any prior complaints about water freezing near the fountain and the fact that no Omni employees knew of any prior instances where splashing, condensation, or moisture buildup occurred—there was no evidence as to how the ice would have been foreseeable. Accordingly, the Court found no evidence that Omni actively caused the icy conditions on the floor.

The takeaway from this holding is the longstanding rule of law: a plaintiff must prove the defendant had notice of the specific condition that caused her injury. It is not enough to show that there were other spills on the floor of a store; the defendant must have known of the specific spill that injured her. It is not enough to show that merchandise had fallen in the past; the business must have known that some specific piece of merchandise was likely to fall. And in this case, it was not enough to show that the hotel knew it was cold outside; the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew ice was forming in a particular location.

Having lawyers who understand the latest opinions and who can effectively respond to arguments on foreseeability, creation of condition or some other creative twist is critical for managing a company’s risk. KPMLAW is ready to answer any questions you may have about this case or any others.