The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission’s Legal Services Division will host a free Continuing Legal Education (CLE) session highlighting some of the most common issues and questions related to upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Code.

TABC will host the program on September 25 at the agency’s Austin headquarters, 5806 Mesa Drive, and the event is open to all interested attorneys. Attendees who complete the training will earn 2 hours of CLE credit.

“As attorneys who represent TABC, we understand some of the legal challenges related to enforcing a statute as complex as the Alcoholic Beverage Code,” said TABC General Counsel Clark Smith. “The purpose of the program is to help attorneys representing TABC-licensed businesses with some of the most common sticking points in the law. The ultimate goal is to keep those businesses in compliance and allow them to better contribute to the Texas economy.”

Scheduled sessions and instructors at the training include:

• Protest Procedures and Practices Under the Alcoholic Beverage Code – Judith Kennison & Sandra Patton
• TABC and the Public Information Act – Raika Rowe
• Vicarious Liability: Understanding, Limiting, and Mitigating Exposure to Alcoholic Beverage Code Liabilities – Edgar Korzeniowski
• Trade Practices: Advertising & Promotion of Alcoholic Beverages, Relaxed Restrictions for Charitable Events, and Partnerships with Unlicensed Third Parties – Matthew Cherry

To sign up for the September Training, email dina.powell@tabc.texas.gov or contact TABC’s General Counsel’s Office at (512) 206-3367.

Original Press Release: https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/home/press_releases/2018/20180829.asp

I must briefly digress: at this point, you may rightly be wondering what a “Food Service Establishment” is. According to the New York City Health Code, it is “a place where food is provided for individual portion service directly to the consumer whether such food is provided free of charge or sold, whether consumption occurs on or off the premises or is provided from a pushcart, stand or vehicle.” That definition seems broad enough to cover someone giving away potato chips out of a shopping cart, so the new regulation is replete with exemptions and qualifications – the most important being that only FSEs with 15 or more locations would be required to comply.

Returning to the action, the rule requiring the telltale salt-shaker icons was set to take effect on March 1. The National Restaurant Association took action, seeking a preliminary injunction in New York Supreme Court, but was originally rebuffed when the Supreme Court judge denied the injunction and ruled that the City could proceed to enforce the regulation. The Association appealed, however, and at the last moment – February 29 – the appellate court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the regulation from being implemented while the Association continues its legal action to invalidate it.

Restaurateurs with 15 or more locations that do business in New York City certainly will be staying tuned as the Association’s appeal proceeds, but other hospitality business would do well to keep an eye on things as well. Particularly in light of the FDA’s new menu-labeling requirements, if New York City’s would-be sodium warnings are upheld, those little salt shakers may be only the first of many symbols to adorn menus in any number of places.

Read the original article here. 

47% believe their company is entirely responsible for their well-being while on a business trip.

That means providing travelers with safe transportation, lodging and access to support. It also means understanding where they are and being able to communicate with and assist them in a crisis. Forty-five percent of male travelers and 47 percent of female travelers pegged their employers with complete responsibility for their well-being while on a business trip. Thirty-three percent of males and 41 percent of females relied on their companies to be very responsible, and 18 percent of males and 10 percent of females felt they shared equal responsibility with employers. Below that level, percentages for both groups were small.

Slicing the data by travel frequency brought starker differences to the surface. Travelers hitting the road 12 or more times a year levied much more responsibility on their companies. More than 64 percent of frequent travelers said their company was entirely responsible for their well-being, and 29 percent said the company was “very responsible.”

94% would opt in for GPS tracking of their mobile device if traveling to a high-risk market.

Defining a high-risk market has become increasingly difficult, but where travelers perceive an increased risk, the vast majority would sign up for GPS tracking of their whereabouts. The result is curious, given the fact that 20 percent of respondents cited GPS tracking as “not appropriate” in general, even in high-risk markets. GPS tracking may seem invasive in concept, but the option becomes more attractive put into the context of a specific trip.

Given their declared reliance on their companies for their well-being, frequent travelers were the least squeamish about all suggested traveler-tracking strategies. Two-thirds said GPS tracking was fine for “all trips,” compared with just 45 percent of total respondents. Two-thirds of all respondents were comfortable with employers mining itinerary data for all trips; compare that with more than three-quarters of frequent travelers who assume their employer should be scanning itinerary data for all trips. Nearly all respondents were comfortable with drilling into itineraries for high-risk trips.

Overall numbers were similar for monitoring credit card data for the last place the traveler charged an expense; 69 percent were open to those queries. Frequent travelers fell in line with the group on this count.

49% of travelers feel less safe on business trips than they did 12 months ago.

Terror attacks, social unrest, refugee crises and downed flights filled headlines over the past 12 months. While business travel industry associations reported little market effect on trip volume, BTN’s survey showed a psychic toll on business travelers. All groups reported similar heightened concern, but female business travelers changed the most; 54 percent feel less secure now, compared with 46 percent of males and 47 percent of frequent travelers (among the survey’s sample of frequent travelers, nearly two-thirds were male).

         After the horrible terrorist attacks in Paris and a few weeks later, in San Bernardino, law enforcement officers and intelligence officials around the world are understandably concerned about possible future attacks.  These public servants sacrifice immensely, doing their best every day to try and keep us safe.  Similar to the weather forecaster, they arrive at educated and insightful conclusions about future crime and terrorism trends using various tools at their disposal.  Their tools, including intelligence from a variety of sources, are sophisticated.  They try to cover all the bases, but unlike baseball, this game has more than just three.

Intelligence gaps will always be a part of the equation when strategizing in counterterrorism circles and those that are charged with its analysis are handicapped without regular access to well-placed sources, those with the right “access”.  Pressing intelligence needs today may include detailed information about Isis adherents, the strength of Isis forces, outside support to the group, including financing as well as vulnerabilities and motivations of members.  Significantly, after the above-mentioned attacks, intelligence priorities certainly include reliable information on radicalized individuals posing as refugees heading to Europe.  Similarly, heavy emphasis is undoubtedly being placed on visa scams and suspect sham marriages, especially between Westerners and those coming from unstable regions.

But all the well-placed human and technical source-derived intelligence is incomplete without the assistance of the public.  The phrase and the meaning of “see something, say something”, have never been more important than they are today.  What appears to be suspicious or unusual activity as observed by a reasonable citizen with good intentions may well be that key grain of intel that police or the FBI needed to solve a case or to prevent an act of terror.  It may also be the initial lead law enforcement receives on a heretofore unknown attempt to violate the law or to threaten the homeland.

Hence, the assistance of the public in thwarting terrorist attacks is crucial.  For that reason, we encourage all citizens to report what appears to them to be suspicious activity.  It may turn out to be nothing, but as long as the citizen’s reporting of such activity is done in good faith, no harm, no foul.

Remember that your local police department and the FBI can take reports of suspicious activity and do just that on a daily basis.  There is also the “terrorist liaison officer”, or “TLO” program, a highly successful collaboration between agencies through which state and local officers, often assigned to a local precinct and working on the street, report suspect information of a homeland security nature.  The information then goes “up the chain” and is analyzed and vetted by a regional intelligence center or Joint Terrorism Task Force.  If the activity is deemed to be a credible threat, investigators are assigned.  If it gets “washed out” as nothing, at least it was reported and the data contained in the report is retained for future reference.

A good example of reporting done by a TLO could be as follows:  A local police officer is interviewing bank employees after a robbery or attempted robbery.  After finishing up, he exits the bank and proceeds to his vehicle.  In checking his environs, the officer notices an individual in plain clothes who has jumped the fence separating the street from a public utility-controlled canal.  The individual accesses a control box while looking around.  He then slams the box shut, hops the fence and speeds away from the area in an unmarked vehicle.

The activity that the officer observed may not be illegal.  Accessing a utility box within a controlled access area of a canal may be a legitimate activity of the operating authority.  But based on the officer’s experience, the fact that the person he observed was not wearing the utility’s uniform, and was not driving the company van seemed strange.  Furthermore, speeding away from the scene was also unusual.  The officer promptly accesses a dedicated form and possibly dedicated, secure on-line database and files a “suspicious activity report”, or SAR.  The process of vetting and corroboration then begins.

Although the average citizen does not have access to the law enforcement database for filing a SAR, different departments and jurisdictions have made it very easy for the public to report suspicious activity.  Various “tip” lines are available through local police departments and all federal law enforcement agencies.  Furthermore, a citizen can call his or her local authorities and ask to speak to a TLO.  Better to report the information than to sit on it, thinking that it was probably nothing.  Let the professionals decide and above all, do not conduct investigation on your own if you are not a sworn law enforcement officer.  Not only could it be dangerous, it just might be illegal as well.

What are some of the suspicious activity indicators that might presage terrorist activity?  Our website will publish a list of them in January.  In the meantime, send us your comments on this article through the portal on the homepage of our website.

Like this article?  Send us your thoughts to info@securitystrategiestoday.com  and follow us on Twitter @securitystrateg Visit us at http://www.securitystrategiestoday.com

While government officials and intelligence personnel put together the sequence of events leading up to and including the November 13 attacks, we note for our part that the assailants were quite sophisticated and made use of heavy weaponry as well as suicide vests or belts and possibly had access to a rocket launcher.  It is also noteworthy that the group, composed of at least eight men with other co conspirators, incuding women identified after the fact, exhibited sound operational security and tactics.  Security measures included the use of “dark web” communications, target casing, throw-away phones and abandoned vehicles.  The entire operation was likely highly compartmentalized.

Regarding tactics, the high powered weaponry and suicide vests, together with multiple operational teams spread out through the city, virtually guaranteed the group would meet its objective of causing great loss of life and instilling a real sense of fear among the population.

Whether the Paris terrorists’ use of such weapons, security and tactics  is a one-off event or is a harbinger of operational methodolgy for future attacks is not known at this time.  However, it would not be surprising or unusual for aspiring terrorists to adopt “tried and true” methodologies to heighten their chances of “success”.  Success of course, in the sick mind of a terrorist, equates to more carnage, victims and bloodshed.

Of the eight known assailants that killed at least 130 people on the evening of November 13, those that made their way into the Bataclan venue sprayed hundreds of rounds indiscriminantly and subsequently detonated suicide vests  Another assailant was stopped just outside the Stade de France and detonated his explosives jacket, killing himself immediately.  An explosives vest was also used by an as yet unidentified person when confronted by French police during the raids in the Saint Denis suburb in the north of Paris on November 18.

The assembly and use of explosives vests is complex and meticulous, according to sources.  Their use shows a level of expertise not commonly seen outside of the Middle East.  The preparation and distribution of at least six of them in Paris required painstaking planning and significant time.

“A suicide vest requires a munitions specialist.  To make a reliable and effective explosive is not something anyone can do”, said a former French intelligence official to Agence France Presse.

An inexperienced weapons or explosives handler would have a hard time creating an explosive vest that would be stable enough for a person to wear.  It must not detonate by accident and it must also be concealable, added the intel source.

The use of at least half a dozen vests suggests that the munitions specialist is still alive and at large.  The specialist possesses a great deal of technical skill which is not easily replaceable.  He is likely considered to be too valuable to sacrifice in a suicide bombing.  The unstable explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was the explosive used in the attacks and in the Saint Denis raid, a fact that suggests the devices were created in France and were not transported a great distance.

The high-powered Kalashnikov was also the rifle of choice in last week’s carnage and we note that it was also used in the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January.  This does not mean there were operational links between the terrorists who perpetrated Charlie Hebdo and those who created a virtual war zone in Paris last week.  In fact, none has been confirmed.  It does mean that French gun laws-among the toughest in Europe-are ineffective at least in part.  The lack of border controls within the Schengen area and the widespread availability of weapons left over from the Balkan wars in southeastern Europe facilitate arms trafficking and availability on the continent.  Organized crime elements have long had access to such weapons and now it appears that terrorists do as well.

The Paris attacks are sophisticated also for their spectacular nature, which could not have been achieved without a great deal of planning, operational security and compartmentalization of information.  There were at least five crime scenes in Paris: Bataclan, Stade de France, Le Carillon, Le Comptoir Voltaire and Le Petit Cambodge.  Terrorists achieved their objective at four but were refused entry into the stadium.  The simultaneous execution of these attacks required a great deal of planning.  After the attacks, they disposed of a cell phone-later recovered by investigators-and dumped a car on the outskirts of Paris.  Both the phone and the car have provided extensive leads, but that is all after the fact now-reactive mode.

Operational security during the planning stage seems to have been tight.  Neither French nor other intelligence or police services detected the attacks and thus failed to neutralize an active cell of extremists.  That necessarily means that the perpetrators were not talking, emailing or meeting with a great deal of frequency.

In spite of the terrorists’ security consciousness, one cannot overlook the missed signals, disjointed intelligence and “failure to connect the dots” that seem to have beset European services leading up to the attacks.  Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud, killed in the St. Denis raid, slipped back into Europe from Syria undetected even though he was wanted by Belgian authorities.  Then there’s Ismail Omar Mostefai, the Bataclan suicide bomber.  He is suspected of travelling to and from Syria in 2013 and 2014.  Turkish authorities notified the French in December of 2014 and again last June about his suspected travels, for which he made use of his French passport.  The French never responded, according to a source in Turkish law enforcement.

Finally, it appears they kept their plans to themselves.  Talkative terrorists can face exposure through their misplaced trust.  Terrorists and criminals often confide in an apparent friend only to find out later that he or she was secretly informing police of the group’s intentions and activities.  With so many people involved in these attacks, it is extraordinary that no one gave it up-even unwittingly-before execution.  There were clear signs, but much like during the months before the 09/11 attacks in the US, the intelligence was not properly exploited.

Perhaps the most significant operational advantage that the terrorists had in this case was their freedom of movement throughout the Schengen area.  Let us remember that so far, all of the identified attackers were either French or Belgian citizens.  They therefore travelled on EU passports and did not face customs or immigration controls within the block.  They would however be required to produce their passports upon reentry into Schengen, such as overland from Turkey or from a point in the Middle East via a scheduled airline flight.  System failures at all levels contributed to the worst act of violence in France since World War II.

There are too many “take aways” to enumerate here and we are still in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.  However, it is safe to say that the attacks will cause a rethinking-and possibly retooling-of the European unity and integration model.  They will also inevitably force police and intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic to adjust their tactics in order to keep up with and anticipate terrorists’ use of new technologies and weaponry.  As they do, we can expect a lively legal debate on civil liberties and freedom of movement and association.

Seems like 09/11 all over.

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Anthony G. Marshall was a renowned educator, author, speaker, and columnist for Hotel & Motel Management Magazine. His writing brought hospitality law to the masses, so that operators—not just lawyers—could understand what the law expected of them. He became the first recipient of the Tony Marshall Award at the 2005 Hospitality Law Conference.

The Award

Each year at the Hospitality Law Conference, the Tony Marshall Award is given to someone who has made pioneering and lasting contributions to the field of hospitality law. In presenting the award, the selection board seeks to recognize someone who exemplifies Tony Marshall’s commitment to hospitality law.
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Ever since Igor Sikorsky created the first mass-produced helicopter in 1944, rotary-winged aircraft have been the go-to vehicle for quick, short-range evacuations. Unlike most fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters need no runway to land, and can hover in relative safety above the ground while waiting for evacuees to arrive at the landing zone. They’re an easy choice for travel managers who are developing a modern, effective evacuation plan for mobile employees.

Helicopters, however, have a number of weaknesses—including difficulty flying at high altitude. The rotors of a helicopter work most effectively in dense air, where their circular motion generates maximum lift. At high altitude, air density gradually decreases, which in turn degrades the lift characteristics of the rotor system and decreases the flight stability of airframes. The U.S. Army, having learned in Afghanistan how perilous high-altitude helicopter operations can be, created a flight school in Colorado dedicated to teaching pilots how to fly at high altitude.

When choosing an evacuation vehicle and service, you should consider this particular aspect of altitude. In some high altitude areas, alternative methods of evacuation—though they may take more time—may ultimately be a better choice for the safety of your evacuees. In other cases, when a helicopter is the best or only option, ensure that the service you use trains its pilots extensively in high-altitude operations. Pilots who have extensive experience flying at sea level but no high-altitude training will likely endanger your evacuees.

Originally published on Tuesday, September 17, 2013
570 views at time of republishing
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1. Don’t cross your legs while sitting in public. Muslims consider the shoe dirty because it makes contact with the ground. Crossing your legs in public, especially while talking to someone, can be seen as very rude if the bottom of your shoe is visible to others.

2. Avoid public displays of affection. Some Muslim countries merely frown upon this behavior; others, like Dubai and Saudi Arabia, have been known to actually incarcerate Westerners for hugging, kissing, and dancing in public.

3. Always accept offerings of tea or coffee. Tradition-minded Muslim hosts almost always offer guests either tea or coffee. While it won’t necessarily be seen as rude if you decline, a gracious guest typically accepts what a host offers.

4. Don’t eat in public during Ramadan. Not only will this act offend all Muslims who witness it—after all, they are currently fasting from dawn until dusk—it can also get you expelled from the country. Some countries like Morocco punish only Muslims who fail to observe Ramadan, while places like Saudi Arabia will castigate Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Please keep in mind that these tips apply to varying degrees in different countries, depending primarily upon local customs and laws. Some Muslim countries are very traditional, while others have adopted or at least tolerate modern Western behaviors. Know the unique peccadillos of the culture you’re about to enter and stay safe.

Originally published on Tuesday, September 24, 2013
1153 views at time of republishing

Travel managers and mobile employees alike must concern themselves with the reality of facing a nuclear incident like Fukushima while traveling and working abroad. While very rare, nuclear plant malfunctions can prove disastrous for the region around them, resulting in dangerous radiation exposure and widespread evacuations. When mobile employees travel to areas in which a nuclear reactor is located, consider the following factors:

1. Weather. The Fukushima plant met its end not by operator error, but rather the simple misfortune of being located on a coast when a tsunami struck. Nuclear plants located in coastal regions where tsunamis and typhoons are more prevalent, such as the shores of Southeast Asia, have an elevated risk of incident. Also watch out for reactors in locales with a recent history of significant seismic activity.

2. Size. There are reactors, and then there are reactors. The Syrian reactor outside Damascus, for example, is a Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR); designed in Canada during the 1970s, MNSRs operate on just a few hundred fuel rods and typically serve an experimental role instead of being a regional power source. Fukushima, in comparison, operated on several thousand fuel rods. The potential radiation release from multi-unit regional power reactors like Fukushima and Chernobyl is far greater than that of an MNSR.

3. Safety. In 1986, a Soviet nuclear reactor called Chernobyl experienced a catastrophic failure and released lethal amounts of radiation all across the Ukrainian countryside. Thirty-one people died and some 120,000 more were evacuated from the surrounding area. An international investigation later discovered the cause of the meltdown to be a combination of widespread operator error and design deficiencies. Nuclear reactors are arguably the safest power source in modern times, but that safety relies heavily upon the regulations and diligence of the company/state operating the reactor.

4. Security. It hasn’t happened yet, but every nuclear reactor standing today is a dream target for terrorist groups, offering the opportunity to turn a few hundred pounds of conventional explosives into a radioactive regional disaster. If the company or government operating a reactor in a given region is providing substandard security around the facility, this increases the likelihood of a nuclear incident occurring.

Originally published on Wednesday, September 25, 2013
788 views at time of republishing

1. Accommodations may not meet reasonable health standards. While the reputation rating system on Airbnb appears to serve as a powerful deterrent to renting out unclean properties, it can still happen, and hosts typically aren’t required by law to meet the same standards of cleanliness as a hotel.

2. Accommodations may not meet reasonable safety standards. While hotels are required by law to install and maintain safety features like smoke detectors and fire escapes, many private residences—especially older ones—do not have these features.3. Accommodations may not meet reasonable security standards. Hotels almost universally control access to various parts of their building(s) and typically have at least basic security measures in place in parking lots and entry areas, while many houses and apartments do not.     Corporate Travel and Security managers would be well advised to use diligence in assessing the safety and security of these offerings just as they do the more traditional lodging community.     Originally published on Tuesday, August 26, 2014
2107 views at time of republishing